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Rice v. Cayetano: Trouble in Paradise for Native Hawaiians
Claiming Special Relationship Status
The United States government has long claimed a "special
relationship" with the once-sovereign peoples whose culture and
autonomy were forever altered and in some cases destroyed by
Western expansion.' As distinguished from other minority groups,
indigenous tribal Indians2 have a unique legal and political
relationship with the federal government,' based largely upon their
1. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 529 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that
the federal government's relationship with descendants of indigenous people is of a
"fiduciary character"); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (noting that Congress
has a "unique obligation towards the Indians"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
383 (1886) (describing Indian tribes as dependent "wards of the nation"); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (equating the relationship between the federal
government and Indians to ward and guardian). The numerous interchangeable terms
referring to a singular federal government-native relationship illustrate its various origins
and continue to obscure the scope of the relationship. See GILBERT L. HALL, THE
FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 3 (1979).
2. Although "Native Americans" is generally the preferred term for describing the
indigenous people of North America, this Note uses the terms "Indians" and "Indian
tribes" when describing the special relationship for reasons outlined in Morton v. Mancari,
which relied on a classification of Indian tribes as political entities. See Mancari,417 U.S.
at 553-55. In contrast, "Native American" can connote a racial classification, making use
of the term misleading in conjunction with the special relationship because the U.S.
Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on whether the relationship includes Native
Americans lacking a tribal structure. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAw 1-2 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW] (observing that rights and obligations of individual Indians
primarily are derived from their tribal ties); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protectionand
the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 560 (1996)
("[N]either Mancarinor any other case directly stated.., that the special relationship was
limited to Indian tribes and their members."). Otherwise, this Note conforms to prevailing
terminology to describe indigenous groups. Federal statutes commonly use the term
"Native American" to refer collectively to American Indians, Native Hawaiians and other
Pacific Islanders (such as American Samoans), and Alaska Natives. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2991, 2991a (1994) (naming these groups as beneficiaries of legislation to promote selfsufficiency). Modem federal laws, with slight variations, generally use the term "Native
Hawaiian" to refer to any individual whose "ancestors were natives of the area which
consists of the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778," see, e.g., Native American Programs Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2992c(3) (1994), although a few statutes include only Native Hawaiians
with fifty percent native blood. See e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 3764(3)(B) (1994). To avoid
confusion with the narrower definitions promulgated by the State of Hawaii for its own
programs, see infra note 37, this Note subscribes to the more general terminology of
"Native Hawaiians" when referring to the native peoples who claim the governmentnative "special relationship."
3. HALL, supra note 1, at iii; see also Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381 (characterizing the
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sovereign status that pre-existed the arrival of Europeans4 and7
6
5
continues to be recognized through treaties, laws, court decisions
relationship between tribes and the government as "difficult to define"); DAVID E.
WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:

THE

MASKING OF JuSTICE 21 (1997) (noting the peculiarities that mark the federal-Indian

relationship). The extent and nature of the fiduciary obligations inherent in the trust
relationship are vague and vary to certain degrees from tribe to tribe. See Del. Tribal Bus.
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977) (stating that Congress has some discretion to
determine how different Indian groups shall participate in tribal income); W. Shoshone
Bus. Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993) (observing that the government
may recognize a group of Native Americans for some purposes but not others); Donald
Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial
Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 353, 397 & n.179 (1997) (noting
that some Alaska Native groups are not considered "tribes" for the purposes of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1994)); Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 124648 (1975) (summarizing different conceptions of the trust doctrine). At a minimum, the
federal government has a duty to act in good faith in the best interests of Indians. See
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (observing that Congress
has undertaken a moral obligation to the Indians of the "highest responsibility and trust").
Other organizations have provided their own definitions of the trust obligations arising
from the special relationship. See, e.g., AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 95TH
CONG., FINAL REPORT 131-36 (Comm. Print May 17, 1977) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y4.In2/10.R29N1) [hereinafter AIPRC FINAL REPORT] (noting that the government has
a legal obligation to promote Indian self-governance and economic independence and
must provide social and economic services to raise the Indian standard of living); Bureau
of Indian Affairs Organization: HearingsBefore the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong. 106-25 (1977) (Sup. Does. No. Y4.In2/11:In2/2) (statement of James A. Joseph,
Under Secretary, Dep't of the Interior) (stating that the federal obligation is to protect
"valuable Indian lands, water, minerals and other natural resources"). Additionally, the
Institute for the Development of Indian Law identifies three broad areas encompassed by
the trust obligation: protection of trust property, protection of the right to selfgovernance, and "provision of ... social, medical and educational services necessary for
survival of the tribe." HALL, supra note 1, at 9. Court decisions establish that the United
States Congress is the trustee for Indians and has the sole power to decide the scope of its
unique obligations. See Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1921) (observing that
Congress has full power to legislate over the Indians); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28, 46-47 (1913) (stating that Congress, not the courts, determines the extent of the special
relationship); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407,417-19 (1865) (holding that
the right to exercise power over Indians belongs solely to Congress). Congress, in turn,
has delegated much of the management of the trust responsibility to agencies, primarily
the Department of the Interior, which houses the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1994) (granting the authority over Indian-related matters to a Commissioner of Indian
Affairs under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior).
4. See VINE DELORIA JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 7-12 (1999) (asserting that ideas regarding Native
American tribal nation status have remained virtually unchanged since the preRevolutionary War era); Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law
of the United States, 31 GEO. LJ. 1, 16-21 (1942) (noting that Spanish dealings with native
peoples heavily influenced subsequent federal government policy); William W. Quinn, Jr.,
FederalAcknowledgement of American Indian Tribes, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 338
(1990) (observing implicit and explicit recognition of the "sovereignty and autonomy" of
Native Americans by colonial powers).
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Although its origins are

unclear,10 the relationship stems from the federal government's
5. See, e.g., Treaty with the Kaskaskias, Aug. 13, 1803, U.S.-Kaskaskias, 7 Stat. 78
(granting "care and patronage" to the Kaskaskias tribe); Treaty with the Creek Nation,
Aug. 7, 1790, U.S.-Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 35 (acknowledging the federal government's duty
to protect the tribe); Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 25, 1785, U.S.-Cherokees, 7 Stat. 18
(guaranteeing peace and protection to the tribe); Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22,
1784, U.S.-Six Nations, 7 Stat. 15 (receiving the tribes into the protection of the United
States); see also 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES (1904)
(compiling the texts of government treaties with the Indians from 1778-1868); FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES:
ANOMALY 446-500 (1994) (listing more than 360

THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL

ratified Indian treaties between 1778

and 1869).
6. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998) (extending trust status to Indian lands indefinitely); Snyder Act of 1921, 25
U.S.C. § 13 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (authorizing federal funds for the "benefit, care and
assistance of the Indians throughout the United States"); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, 4
Stat. 735 (seeking restoration of tribal rights); Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 5, 2 Stat.
139, 141-42 (prohibiting unauthorized settlement on Indian land); Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1
Stat. 50 (protecting property and liberty rights of Indians from invasion).
7. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("Indian
tribes['] ...claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government."); see
Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (describing Indian nations as
separate communities that retained their natural rights); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1831) (characterizing tribes as "domestic dependent nations"). Other cases
suggest that Indian sovereignty is limited to internal affairs. See United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of
");Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381sovereignty over both their members and their territory ....
82 (noting that Indians are a distinct people who possess "the power of regulating their
internal and social relations," but lack "the full attributes of sovereignty").
8. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 7423, 3 C.F.R. 189 (1935) (amending employment
requirements for the Bureau of Indian Affairs); Exec. Order of June 13, 1902 (giving
occupancy of land to the San Felipe Pueblos), reprinted in EXECUTIVE ORDERS
RELATING TO INDIAN RESERVATIONS 1855-1922, at 126, 126 (Scholarly Resources, Inc.
1975) [hereinafter INDIAN EXECUTIVE ORDERS]; Exec. Order of Oct. 16, 1891 (extending
the boundaries of the Hoopa reservation), reprinted in INDIAN EXECUTIVE ORDERS,

supra,at 39, 39; Exec. Order of Feb. 7, 1879 (creating a reservation for the Southern Utes),
reprinted in INDIAN EXECUTIVE ORDERS, supra, at 67, 67-68; Exec. Order of May 14,
1855 (establishing the first executive-order reservation), reprinted in INDIAN EXECUTIVE
ORDERS, supra, at 79,79.
9. The Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause).
10. See McClanahan,411 U.S. at 172 n.7 ("The source of federal authority over Indian
matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the
power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and
for treaty making."). Early cases did not state a specific constitutional basis for the
relationship even as they declared its existence. Worcester v. Georgia claimed that
protection arose as a corollary of the "competency" of Congress to enforce and guarantee
treaty conditions. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 594. United States v. Kagama initially rejected the
idea that the Indian Commerce Clause could extend to the criminal laws at issue in
Kagama and suggested that the power "must exist in [the federal government] because it
has never existed anywhere else, ... because it has never been denied, and because it
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acknowledgement that its actions left tribes at risk of extinction and
in need of protection." While initially this paternalistic view of
Indians merely served to increase government control over the
tribes, 2 as federal policy evolved, the paramount function of this
"special relationship" became the nobler goal of promoting self3
governance among the tribes.'
The special relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes is significant not only due to the government's fiduciary
obligations but also due to the differential treatment programs for
beneficiary tribes. 4 Because the relationship with the tribes is
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes." 118 U.S. at 375, 378-79, 384-85 (1886). The
Court apparently derived the protectorate role of the federal government from Congress's
power over the Indians, id.at 384, but scholars have suggested that the source of this
power, termed in many cases as "plenary," has dubious legal foundations. WILKINS, supra
note 3, at 74; Robert T. Coulter, The Denial of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations Under
United States Law, 3 AM. INDIAN J. 3,8 (1977); see also HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 2, at 219 (commenting that Kagama "suggested that congressional power
over Indians may be implied from necessity"); Benjamin, supra note 2, at 543 (1996)
(noting Kagama'srejection of the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of congressional
power and the resulting reliance on historical authority). For a comprehensive discussion
of the "plenary power" concept, see generally David E. Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court's
Explication of "Federal Plenary Power:" An Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal
Sovereignty, 18 AM. IND. Q. 349 (1994). The Court did not specifically denote the Indian
Commerce Clause as the source of congressional empowerment for the differential
treatment of tribes until its landmark decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552
(1974). See also Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825, 830 (D.N.M. 1978) (commenting
on the significance of the Mancaridecision); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the
Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of ConstitutionalDimensions,66 S.CAL. L.
REV. 767,785-86 (1993) (same).
11. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
12. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (citing Congress's
plenary power over Native American affairs as a basis for restrictions on tribal
sovereignty); see also WILKINS, supra note 3, at 76-81 (arguing that the view of Native
Americans as requiring protection led to greater governmental interference in tribal
affairs).
13. See Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) (1994) (stating
that the Act serves to "recogniz[e] the obligation of the United States to respond to the
strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination"); Indian Financing Act of
1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994) (granting financial aid to tribal governments); see also
Haunani-Kay Trask, Klpa'a 'Afna: Native HawaiianNationalismin Hawai'i, in HAWAI'I:
RETURN TO NATIONHOOD 15, 25 (Ulla Hasager & Jonathan Friedman eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Trask, Native Hawaiian Nationalism] (observing that under President Nixon,
the policy towards Native Americans became one of self-determination rather than
guardianship); see generally AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 125. But see
DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 4, at 158-59 (arguing that the federal government's
heavy involvement in Native American affairs continues to undermine tribal sovereignty).
14. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555 (upholding a preferential hiring program for Native
Americans in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)). Citing the "unique legal status of
Indian tribes under federal law" and the "plenary power of Congress ...to legislate on
behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes" inherent in the Indian Commerce Clause, the
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considered both legal and political, 15 the Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of disparate treatment programs for tribal
members in cases that otherwise would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 6

According to the Court, this differential treatment is

Mancari Court ruled that the BIA's preferential hiring of Indians was not invidious racial
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 553-54.
The criteria used to determine Indian status would exclude many individuals considered
members of the Native American race. Id at 551, 553-54. Because the BIA had an
exceptional role in the oversight and administration of policies specifically directed at
members of quasi-sovereign entities, the Court determined that the hiring criterion was
reasonably formulated to further the federal government's goals in regard to Indians,
including increased self-governance. The Court likened the condition to the requirement
that a United States Senator should reside in the state that she represents. k at 554-55;
see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643-45 (1977) (rejecting a challenge by
Indians arguing that special treatment constituted racial discrimination); Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (concluding that as long as Indians had not
abandoned their tribe, they were permitted to receive preferential treatment
notwithstanding their widespread integration into the surrounding community).
The Antelope petitioners had been indicted for a homicide on an Idaho Indian
reservation. They sought to be tried under Idaho law which, unlike the federal law
applied on the reservation, did not apply the felony murder rule. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at
644. Reversing a Ninth Circuit decision that found the convictions in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, the Antelope court concluded that, based on the principles expressed in
Mancari, denial of access to the state court was not based on impermissible racial
classifications. See id. at 645-46; HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at
218-19.
15. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645 (stating that preferences are given to Indians " 'not
as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities'"
(quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554)); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (describing the
preferential distinction as "political rather than racial in nature"); HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 1-2 ("Indian law is founded in the political
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes."); GAIL K. SHEFFIELD, THE
ARBITRARY INDIAN 4-5 (1997) (observing that "[tihe political nature of tribal status is
one step removed from considerations of 'ethnicity' .... "). The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that differential treatment derived from the special relationship might
affect some individuals whose tribal affiliations are tenuous or nonexistent, but has not
directly confronted this issue. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646 n.7 (noting that while official
enrollment in a tribe was not a requirement for federal jurisdiction, the Court was not
called on to address this issue because the petitioners were official members of a tribe);
Moe, 425 U.S. at 480 n.16 (declining to disturb the lower court's holding that Indians living
on the reservation were not subject to the cigarette sales tax regardless of their actual
tribal membership, but recognizing that different rules might apply to Indians residing off
the reservation).
16. See, e.g., Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-50 (1977) (denying Indians the right to be tried
in state court for crimes committed in Indian territory); Moe, 425 U.S. at 479-83 (holding
that exempting reservation Indians from paying taxes does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment). As Antelope suggests, the special relationship does not result in enhanced
rights and may, in some cases, serve to restrict rights of Indians because it essentially
grants the federal government greater latitude over their affairs. Antelope, 430 U.S. at
645-50 (applying federal criminal law to Indians, resulting in harsher punishment than
prescribed under state law); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990)
(acknowledging the federal government's plenary power to "impose burdens or benefits"
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permissible as long as it is rationally tied to the fulfillment of
obligations-including promoting self-governance and preserving
cultural integrity-that arise from the relationship. 17 This "rational
basis" standard, applied by the Supreme Court in 1974 in Morton v.
Mancari,8 enables Congress to enact federal laws and programs
specifically designed to benefit members of Indian tribes.'9 The
Mancari majority indicated that, whenever special treatment passed
the rational basis test, the Court would be unwilling to disturb federal
legislative pronouncements. 2 ° The classification of the special
relationship as legal and political is crucial; were the relationship
based on a racial distinction, the differential treatment would have to
withstand the heightened standard of strict scrutiny to survive a
constitutional challenge. 2'
on Indians "as a class").
17. Mancari,417 U.S. at 555.
18. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding that congressional acts that permit differential
treatment for native peoples will not be disturbed "[a]s long as the special treatment can
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians").
19. See, e.g., Snyder Act of 1921, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (welfare
benefits); Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3201
(1994) (abuse prevention); Indian Employment, Training and Related Services
Demonstration Act of 1992, 25 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994) (joblessness reduction); Tribal
Economic Development and Technology Related Education Assistance Act of 1990, 25
U.S.C. § 1851 (1994) (grants to tribally controlled colleges). Courts consistently have
County of Yakima v.
upheld legislation providing special benefits to Indians.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992)
(excise tax exemption); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 679 (1979) (granting fishing rights to Indian Tribes); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 388-90 (1976) (upholding a law granting reservation Indians
immunity from personal property taxes); Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist.,
424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (per curiam) (granting tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over
tribal adoptions); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 205-06 (1975) (preventing state
from regulating hunting and fishing on Indian territory); Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d
1110, 1114 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding a law granting Indians the exclusive right to
handcrafted jewelry sales); Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F. Supp. 914, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(recognizing federally reserved fishing rights for Indians); Schmasow v. Native Am. Ctr.,
978 P.2d 304,307-08 (Mont. 1999) (upholding preferential hiring program for Indians); see
also Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Blue Lake Forest Prods., 143 B.R. 563, 563 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1992) (inapplicability of state commercial laws to alienation of Indian trust property); In re
M.K., 964 P.2d 241, 244 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998) (heightened burden of proof in termination
of parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act).
20. See Mancari,417 U.S. at 555.
21. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny is the sole standard of review for racial classifications); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989) (applying heightened scrutiny in invalidating
a race-based preference program designed to remedy effects of past discrimination).
Predicting the issues raised in Rice v. Cayetano, Professor Benjamin asserted that Adarand
and Croson demonstrated increasing disapproval of even beneficial racial classifications,
thereby heightening the importance of the tribal classification. See Benjamin, supra note
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Among the groups claiming inclusion within the special
relationship are natives of the Hawaiian islands. Although this group
had a governmental structure that differed from the tribal system
typically found in groups indigenous to the North American

mainland,2 Native Hawaiians are named among the beneficiaries of
much of the legislation that provides special services to Native

Americans.3

Despite numerous congressional acts implemented to

benefit Native Hawaiians, the status of this group of indigenous
people remained somewhat ambiguous. 24 In Rice v. Cayetano,25 the
2, at 538-41.
22. See DAvID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 945 (4th ed. 1998) (describing the Hawaiian land tenure system that prevailed before
the arrival of Captain James Cook as similar to medieval feudal systems); Benjamin, supra
note 2, at 572-81 (noting that native Hawaiians are not organized into any entity that
resembles a traditional tribe). But see Jon Van Dyke, The PoliticalStatus of the Native
Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 144-45 (1998) (pointing to substantive
similarities in the plight of Native Hawaiians and traditional tribal groups).
23. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994) (protecting
properties with cultural and historic significance to native groups); Native Hawaiian
Education Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7912 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing funds
to promote educational achievement); Indian Health Care Amendments of 1992, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1683 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing appropriations to improve
quantity and quality of health services and preventative medical care); Native American
Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2902 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (granting statutory protection to
the Native Hawaiian language); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing repatriation of funerary
objects and human remains); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (extending preferential status to grant applications to fight drug abuse
among Native Americans); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (promising to protect Native American faith practices); Native
American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991-2992 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(enacting various financial and cultural programs); Older Americans Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3001-3058 (providing health, housing, and economic benefits); Native Hawaiian
Health Care Improvement Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11701-11714 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(providing comprehensive health promotion and disease prevention services).
24. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000) (noting that whether Congress has
bestowed a status on Hawaiian natives akin to that of Indians tribes is "not yet established
in case law"). But see icL at 533-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that numerous
programs Congress has implemented on behalf of Native Hawaiians affirm their status as
an Indian tribe). Although Congress has not explicitly spoken on the inclusion of
Hawaiian natives into the federal-Indian special relationship, courts and commentators
have interpreted some legislation and federal policy as an implicit acknowledgement that
such a relationship exists. See Native Hawaiian Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7902 (1994)
(acknowledging a "special relationship" between the federal government and Hawaiian
natives); Native Hawaiian Health Care Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11701 (1994)
(referring to a "trust relationship" and a "historical and unique legal relationship"
between Native Hawaiians and the United States); Joint Resolution (Apology
Resolution), Act of Nov. 23, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) (apologizing
for depriving Native Hawaiians of the right to self-determination and encouraging
reconciliation efforts); Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the
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United States Supreme Court overturned an electoral scheme that
restricted the right to vote for officers in the state-created Office of
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) to those defined as Native Hawaiians as

determined by ancestry.2 6 The Court found that this scheme relied on
a race-based distinction, rather than a legal or political one, and
therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment.27 This rejection of the
Native Hawaiians' chosen electoral structure had the practical effect
of frustrating Native Hawaiians' attempts to attain the sovereignty
that has become a central objective of federal Native American
policy? 8 The rejection of the voting structure, which the Hawaii
legislature implemented to administer a state-run trust endowed to
improve conditions for descendants of Hawaiian natives, also raised
doubts about the ability of Native Hawaiians to claim the special
relationship and possibly signified trouble for other Native American
groups with similar governing structures. 2 9

Union (Admission Act), Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959) (creating a "public
trust" to benefit Native Hawaiians); Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes
Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984) (imposing a trust obligation arising from
federal laws); Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Homes Lands, 640 P.2d 1161, 1168-70 (D.
Haw. 1982) (drawing an analogy between Hawaiian natives and mainland natives and
special programs provided to both groups in imposing a trust relationship between
Congress and Hawaiians); Exec. Order No. 13125, § 10(b), 3 C.F.R. § 193 (1999)
(establishing an advisory commission on Pacific Islanders); HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 802-04 ("Since 1920 the federal government has acted in
apparent recognition of a trust obligation to Native Hawaiians by legislating specifically
for their benefit."); Mark A. Inciong, The Lost Trust Native Hawaiian Beneficiaries
Under the HawaiianHomes Commission Act, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 2:171 (1991);
Van Dyke, supra note 22, at 104-10, (asserting that Congress has recognized the special
status of Native Hawaiians by including them in legislation benefiting Native Americans
generally). But see Han v. Dep't of Justice, 824 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (D. Haw. 1993)
(determining the trust obligation to be the responsibility of the state, not federal,
government).
25. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
26. Id at 499.
27. Id. at 514-15.
28. See Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (advocating legislation to facilitate tribes in maximizing autonomy),
reprintedin PUB. PAPERS 564, 564-66 (1970); Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS
96, 96-98 (1983) (affirming a policy of strengthening tribal governments); see also Robert
N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of FederalProtection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 1067-68 (1981) (advocating the
adoption of self-determination as the model for the long-term development of Indian
tribes).
29. The most obvious parallel is with Alaska Natives, another conglomerate of
aboriginals who share cultural traits but are not necessarily associated with tribal bodies.
Congressional action on behalf of Native Alaskans signals that their status, however, is
more securely established within the special relationship. See infra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text (comparing and contrasting similarities between Alaska and Hawaii
natives). The implications are much stronger in many respects for colonially acquired
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This Note briefly recounts the developments and history leading
to the creation of the electoral scheme at issue in Rice and discusses
the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's invalidation under the
Fifteenth Amendment of Hawaii's eligibility requirements for voting
for OHA trustees." The Note then considers the implications of the
Rice Court's decision to classify the ancestry requirement as racial.31
Next, the Note examines whether Native Hawaiians will achieve a

more secure standing within the federal government-native special
relationship.3 2 Finally, the Note examines the current state of affairs

for OHA, suggests strategies for achieving greater sovereignty for
Native Hawaiians, and analyzes the impact of recent initiatives
33
intended to settle the questions raised by Rice.
Rice addressed the validity of a voting structure for the
administration of a trust benefiting Native Hawaiians. Initially
established by the United States Congress as a lands and loan
program to provide homesteads and financial assistance to
descendants of indigenous inhabitants and rehabilitate the native
population from the devastating effects stemming from Western

contact,34 the trust was turned over to the State of Hawaii as a
territories such as Guam, American Samoa, Micronesia, and possibly Puerto Rico.
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 798 n.4 (noting that additional
conditions specific to territories limit the comparison); see generally Ediberto Roman,
Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV.
1119, 1122-26 (1997) (charging that U.S. policies toward current and former territories are
imperialistic and racist and are calculated to undermine self-determination); Haunani-Kay
Trask, Politics in the Pacific Islands: Imperialism and Native Self-Determination, 16
AMERASIAN J. 1, 5-10 (1990) (noting the common struggle against colonization faced by
many of the Pacific Rim islands); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships
Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445,
510-17 (1992) (offering theories on the means to achieve increased self-governance); Jon
M. Van Dyke et al., Self-Determinationfor Nonself-governing Peoples andfor Indigenous
Peoples: The Cases of Guam and Hawai'i, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 640-42 (1996)
(examining rights to autonomy under international law).
30. See infranotes 34-70 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 96-133 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
34. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 (HHCA), Pub. L. No. 66-34, ch. 42,42
Stat. 108 (1921); see H.R. REP. No. 66-839, at 4 (1920) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/2:7653)
(testimony of Sen. Wise) ("[T]he Hawaiian people are dying.... [T]he only way to save
them ...is to take them back to the lands and give them the mode of living that their
ancestors were accustomed to and in that way rehabilitate them."); MELODY
KAPILIALOHA MACKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 43-50 (1991)
[hereinafter NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK] (describing the native population

as a race endangered by "poverty, disease, and political powerlessness" that accompanied
the arrival of Westerners). In providing what is perhaps the first federal statutory
definition of "Native Hawaiian "-"any descendant of not less than one-half part of the

20011

NATIVE HAWAIIAN STATUS

condition of its admission to the union in 1959. 35 After several years
of direct state management of the trust, in 1978 the state sought to
give greater control to the trust's intended beneficiaries by amending
the state constitution to establish the OHA to administer a portion of
the trust and its proceeds.3 6
The OHA's legislative mandate is to seek better conditions,

conduct advocacy efforts, seek and disperse donations and grants, and
receive reparations on behalf of two designated groups of state
citizens: "Hawaiians," generally defined as those with any degree of
descent from the original native population present before the arrival
of Westerners in 1778, and a smaller subclass of "native Hawaiians,"37
classified as those with at least fifty percent Hawaiian ancestry.

blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778"-the HHCA
presumably served as the model for subsequent legislation. HHCA, Pub. L. No. 66-34, ch.
42, § 201(7), 42 Stat. 108, 108 (1921); see also Native Hawaiians Vote on Sharing a Trust's
Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1989, at Bl (noting that the origins of the definition are in
the HHCA).
35. See Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union
(Admission Act), Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959). The Admission Act limits
use of the proceeds from the trust fund for the following: (1) support of public education,
(2) improvement of conditions for native Hawaiians as defined in the HHCA, (3)
development of farm and home ownership, (4) making of public improvements, and (5)
provision of land for public use. See id These purposes are reiterated in state law
governing the OHA's operation. See HAW.REV. STAT. § 10-3 (1993). As long as the
funds are used for the specified purposes, the state has wide leeway to establish the
management structure of the trust. See Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4,
6 (1959).
36. The Hawaii Constitution states in part that "[t]he Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall
hold title to all the real and personal property now or hereafter set aside or conveyed to it
which shall be held in trust for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians." HAw. CONST. art. XII,
§ 5. The amendment to the Hawaiian Constitution establishing the OHA was adopted by
a majority vote of all Hawaii's citizens in November 1978. The legality of the state's
delegation of the trust to the agency was upheld in Price v. Hawaii,921 F.2d 950, 957 (9th
Cir. 1990). See also Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the
history of the Admissions Act, the OHA, and related laws). The creation of the OHA is
examined in Jon M. Van Dyke, The Constitutionalityof the Office of HawaiianAffairs, 7
U. HAW.L. REV. 63,68-69 (1985).
37. HAw.REv. STAT. § 10-2 (1993 & Supp. 1999). Specifically, the statute defines a
"Hawaiian" as "any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which
peoples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii." ld. This definition corresponds
closely to the definition promulgated in many federal statutes. See supra note 2. In
contrast, a "native Hawaiian" is:
any descendant of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the
Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778... provided that the term identically refers to
the descendants of such blood quantum of such aboriginal peoples which
exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which
peoples thereafter continued to reside in Hawaii.
Aw. REV. STAT. § 10-2. The seminal year 1778 marked the arrival of Captain Cook to
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Operation of the OHA is overseen by nine trustees, who "shall be
Hawaiians" elected
by "qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as
38
provided by law.

At the heart of the controversy in Rice was the legislature's
definition of "Hawaiian" for the purposes of the OHA constituency.

Harold Rice, a Caucasian cattle rancher who could trace his
ancestors' arrival on the islands to 1831, 3 9 challenged this definition
after the State denied his application to vote in the 1996 OHA

elections. 40 Rice claimed that the voting classification was based
solely on race, violating his constitutional rights under the Fifteenth
Amendment. 41 Hawaii, backed by the federal government, responded
that because the OHA electorate consisted of a distinct group of
indigenous people subject to the federal government-native special
relationship-as acknowledged and validated by federal law and
congressional action-the ancestry requirement challenged by Rice
was legal and political, not racial, in nature.42 Thus characterized, the
requirement did not run afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment.4 3

Alternatively, Hawaii contended that, even if the provisions
contained racial distinctions, such distinctions were permissible under
previous decisions allowing special treatment of Indians. 4
the islands, sparking an influx of Westerners. For purposes of consistency, and to avoid
confusion between "Hawaiians" in the general sense-any citizen of the State of Hawaiiand those who claim the federal government-native special relationship based on their
descendancy from aboriginal people, this Note subscribes to the federal terminology, see
supra note 2, when referring to the latter classification.
38. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5; HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (limiting the definition of
native Hawaiians to ancestors of aboriginals occupying the islands prior to 1778).
39. Christine Donnelly, Rice: It's About Protecting the Constitution, Not 'Racist,'
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 2000, http:llstarbulletin.com2000/02/23/news/
story3.html; Bruce Dunford, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Hawaii's Race-Based
Privileges, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 4, 1999, at A2, 1999 WL 28264822. Although
Rice's ancestors arrived in Hawaii as missionaries, the family later amassed considerable
wealth and political power. Donnelly, supra. Following resolution of the suit, Rice
maintained his support for programs that favor Hawaiians as long as they are based on
need instead of race. Id. Incidentally, two of his grandchildren are considered Hawaiian
under the OHA provisions. Id.
40. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 510. Rice sued Benjamin Cayetano, Governor of Hawaii, in
his official capacity; the Rice opinion and this Note, however, refer to the respondent as
"the State." See id.
41. See id.at 498. The Fifteenth Amendment states that "[the right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
42. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 520.
43. See iL at 529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 518-22. Hawaii also argued that, even if racially based, the provisions
were valid because the election fell under the special-purpose-district exception to the
one-person, one-vote rule of the Fourteenth Amendment and because the voting scheme
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These two fundamental, yet inconsistent, principles of special

treatment for Indians and the prohibition of race-based voting
conditions met head-on in Rice. The case tested the limits of the
Supreme Court's willingness to treat Indians as a political and legal
entity rather than a racial entity, a predicament complicated by the
Native Hawaiians' lack of formal tribal structure. 45 The confrontation
also set the stage for the Supreme Court to overturn or restrict the

use of the rational basis standard in judging differential treatment for
Indians, or, more radically, to rein in congressional power in dealing
with indigenous peoples.
The State's view prevailed in the early rounds of the battle.
Granting summary judgment for the State,46 the United States

District Court for the District of Hawaii determined that Congress
and Hawaii shared a relationship with Native Hawaiians analogous to
the relationship between the United States and Indian tribes; thus,
the voting requirement fell within the wide latitude that the Supreme
Court granted to Congress in matters regarding native groups.4 7
Additionally, the court stated that under the test set out in Mancari,
the voting method did not violate the constitutional ban on racial
classifications because it was "rationally related" to fulfilling the
mandate of the Admission Act. 48 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision,49 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.50

was analogous to a fiduciary-beneficiary relationship. Id. at 522-24. Both claims received
scant attention, perhaps because race was not at issue in the leading special-purpose case
cited by the State, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,410 U.S.
419 (1973). Addressing the State's argument based on Salyer, the Court doubted that the
election was of sufficient limited purpose and disproportionate effect on those permitted
to vote to meet the exception standard. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 522 (citing Ball v. James, 451
U.S. 355 (1981)). Even if the requirements were met, the Court held that compliance with
the Fourteenth Amendment did not excuse noncompliance with the Fifteenth
Amendment. Id The fiduciary argument failed because the correlation between the
OHA constituency and its beneficiaries was questionable, and the reasoning still rested
"on the demeaning premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified
than others to vote on certain matters" in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id at
523.
45. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 582-88 (noting that, unlike American Indians, who
largely remained in quasi-sovereign groups, Native Hawaiians generally did not remain
self-governing due to Western interference).
46. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547,1558 (D. Haw. 1997).
47. See id at 1547-54.
48. Id at 1554-55 (citing the Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6
(1959)); see also supra note 35 (describing the limitations on the use of the trust fund
under the Admission Act).
49. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075,1082 (9th Cir. 1998).
50. Rice v. Cayetano, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999).
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Reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held
that the voting scheme violated the Fifteenth Amendment's
prohibition against the denial or abridgment of rights on account of
race.5 1 Observing that "[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race," the Court
ruled that the ancestral requirement promulgated by the State was
blatantly racial in nature. 2 Dismissing Hawaii's argument that the
statute was race-neutral because it excluded persons of any race who
did not meet its qualifications, 53 the Court focused on the statute's
legislative history, which showed that the language of the ancestry
requirements
originally referred to "race" and later was revised to
"peoples." 54 The analysis then proceeded to the State's main
defense-that Hawaii's race-based voting scheme could be analogized
51. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000). Justice Kennedy issued the majority
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
See id. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, wrote a concurring opinion. See idLat
498-524 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens dissented, see id.at 527-47 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), joined by Justice Ginsburg, who also filed a separate dissent. See id. at 547-48
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 514. As the majority observed, questionable provisions need not expressly
mention race; their evaluation also rests on their ensuing effects. See id. at 513-17. The
Court has struck down state voting requirements that were thinly, or in some cases
transparently, veiled to prevent African Americans and other minorities from voting. See
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342-48 (1960) (holding that the state's power to
determine municipal boundaries is limited by the Fifteenth Amendment); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 467-69 (1953) (ruling that a political party's "white primary" violated the
Fifteenth Amendment); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362-64 (1915) (striking
down a grandfather clause); cf Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (holding that
efforts to segregate voters into separate districts on account of race constitutes a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325
(1966) (invoking the Fifteenth Amendment to invalidate state voting qualifications or
procedures which are facially or effectually discriminatory); Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (invalidating a registration test for new voters on Fifteenth
Amendment grounds); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1944) (ruling that
election machinery operated as an unconstitutional "white primary"); Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (holding that a voter registration scheme operated unfairly and
unconstitutionally against minorities); United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 682 (D.
Ala. 1961) (finding that a registration questionnaire discriminatorily denied blacks the
right to vote). Before the decision in Rice, Professor Benjamin warned that the ancestry
requirement in the "native Hawaiian" definition added an element that was ordinarily
suspect, in contrast to non-suspect criteria such as voluntary membership in an
organization. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 571.
53. The Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Guinn, holding that a voting
literacy requirement, which provided a waiver for " 'lineal descendants'" of those who
were "'on January 1, 1866, or any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of
government, or who at that time resided in some foreign nation,'" was racially
discriminatory in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment even though it made no reference
to race and potentially excluded persons of any race from voting. 238 U.S. at 357, 365
(quoting OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 49 (1910)). In effect, the provision resulted in the
disenfranchisement of virtually all blacks and practically no whites. Id. at 364-65.
54. Rice, 528 U.S. at 515-16.
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to decisions permitting the special treatment of Indians.55 The Court
held that, regardless of the Hawaiian tribal status, the established
congressional authority allowing preferential treatment of Indians in
certain cases does not permit Congress to authorize a voting scheme
like that promulgated by Hawaii.56 The Court declined to address the
unsettled question of whether Congress has recognized the status of
Native Hawaiians as equivalent to that of organized Indian tribesand whether Congress even has the authority to do so 7 Even if
Congress had properly conferred tribal-equivalent status to Native
Hawaiians, the Court likely would have struck down the voting
scheme under the Fifteenth Amendment because the OHA and its
were administered not by a quasi-sovereign body but by the
elections
8
State
In his dissent, Justice Stevens maintained that the Fifteenth
Amendment should not govern the case because the voting
requirement was based on a cultural and political classification
existing apart from race.5 9 He reasoned that the systematic exclusion
of racial minorities found in the classic Fifteenth Amendment cases
referenced by the majority bore no relation to a structure intended to
empower members of an oppressed group. 6° Along with the absence
of invidious discrimination, Justice Stevens identified two principles
distinguishing Rice from a standard race-discrimination case: the
federal government's wide latitude in carrying out the obligations
stemming from the federal government-native special relationship
55. See id. at 518.
56. See id. at 519. Prior cases established that the types of elections encompassed by
the Fifteenth Amendment are wide reaching and include "any election in which public
issues are decided or public officials selected." See Terry, 345 U.S. at 468-69 (ruling that a
political club's role in a pre-primary campaign excluded blacks from any meaningful
participation in the vote and was therefore an abuse of the Fifteenth Amendment).
57. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-19.
58. See id at 519-21.
59. See id. at 538-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Justice Stevens declared that Rice is "virtually the polar opposite of the Fifteenth
Amendment cases on which the Court relied." Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his
view, the Fifteenth Amendment's purpose is to extend the franchise to populations
previously excluded from voting in general elections; thus, it does not necessarily follow
that the Amendment prohibits ancestry-based voting requirements in an election
governing discrete affairs for a limited group. While accepting the majority's view that
ancestry can be a proxy for race, he stated that, in this case, the ancestry requirement did
not operate as such because the OHA's structure and the purpose behind the voting
provision were aimed at securing interests that are political and cultural in nature, not
racial. Id. at 540-46. He likened the ancestry restriction to a hypothetical law that would
permit only descendants of Thomas Jefferson to serve as trustees for Monticello, deeming
that "[s]uch a law would be equally benign, regardless of whether those descendants
happened to be members of the same race." I&. at 545.
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and the State's responsibility to administer the public trust to benefit
Hawaiian natives.61 Justice Stevens also acknowledged the irony of

depriving Native Hawaiians of special benefits aimed at restoring
their society because of a lack of native political institutions,
considering that the United States played a significant role in the
downfall of those institutions. 62
Arguably, Justice Stevens is correct that no racially invidious
intent existed behind the decision to limit the right to vote for OHA

trustees to descendants of "peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
... in 1778." 63 The Fifteenth Amendment, however, prohibits any

discrimination in voting "on account of race,"' even when it stems
from honorable intentions. Ancestry requirements suggest bias
regardless of their intent.65 Indeed, the majority would have faced a
particularly difficult task had it ruled that the statute was politically
based despite apparent racial overtones. 66 While the final legislation
did not mention race explicitly, its history spoke volumes. 67 A ruling
in favor of the State would have eviscerated many well-established
principles of Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence.68 To accept the
dissent's position-that the Fifteenth Amendment should not apply
when the aim is to promote self-governance for formerly sovereign
peoples-would put the Court in the untenable position of evaluating

61. See id at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See iL at 535 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 539 (quoting HAW. REv. STAT. § 10-2 (1993)).
64. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1; see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-13 (1995)
(holding that racial classifications are impermissible regardless of which race is harmed or
benefited).
65. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-65 (1915) (noting that a provision
setting a standard for suffrage based on ancestry could have no rational purpose other
than perpetuating race-based voting).
66. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 515-17. The Court pointed out that the court of appeals
found that the Hawaiian Constitution and applicable statutes " 'contain[ed] a racial
classification on their face.'" Id. at 511 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1079
(9th Cir. 1998)); see also Robert J. Deichert, Note, Rice v. Cayetano: The Fifteenth
Amendment at a Crossroads,32 CoNN. L. REv. 1075, 1106-19 (2000) (concluding that the
Rice majority correctly held that the voting restriction violated the Fifteenth
Amendment).
67. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 517 (noting that "the State's argument is undermined by its
express racial purpose and actual effects").
68. See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 364-65; see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 34546 (1960) (holding that the State could not use its inherent power to circumvent federally
protected rights). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Rice from Gomillion and other
Fifteenth Amendment cases by asserting that the OHA election was not equivalent to a
general election and did not "deny non-Hawaiians of the right to vote in any meaningful
sense." Id at 124 (quoting Rice, 146 F.3d at 1081). For a list of other Fifteenth
Amendment cases, see Van Dyke, supra note 22, at 124 n.199.
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every ancestry-based preference to determine whether the legitimacy
of its purpose.
By restricting its holding to the narrower question of the
constitutional validity of a law limiting participation in a state-run
election to statutorily defined Hawaiians, the majority sidestepped
weightier questions. Had it taken a broader approach, the Rice Court
could have eliminated the use of the rational basis test for programs
mandating differential treatment for some or all Indians, or it could
have reined in the currently expansive congressional latitude to deal
with Native Americans. 9 Although the deferential approach to the
federal government's ability to confer the special relationship remains
intact for now, the Court indicated that congressional power to
recognize Native Hawaiians-and presumably comparable groups of
indigenous
peoples
lacking
traditional
quasi-sovereign
governments-is in dispute. 0 This recognition might mean that the
69. One lower court already has expressed doubt that the Mancari rational relation
test applies to preferences other than those that provide special protection for Indian land,
culture, or political institutions. See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 664-67 (9th Cir.
1997) (addressing the defendant's claims thatAdarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), have overruled
Mancari); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) (holding that the BIA
hiring preference was "sui generis," possibly placing limits on the application of rational
basis review); Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and JudicialPoliticalActivism: Neo-colonialism
and the Supreme Court's New Indian Law Agenda, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 92, 97 (1991)
(asserting that the Court's opinion in Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990), invited equal protection attacks on legislation exempting Native
American Church members from prosecution for certain federal crimes); Ralph W.
Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REv. 587, 598
n.78 (1979) (asserting that the court's characterization of Indians as political in the
Mancari case would not necessary apply in all equal protection cases); cf David C.
Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 759, 867 (1991) ("[T]he equal protection clause itself suggests that Indians are in a
unique position: because they are separate peoples, the clause's norm of racial equality
simply does not apply to them ....Indian-specific legislation is free of equal protection
strictures only to the extent that it is consistent with tribal self-determination, in effect and
in intent.").
70. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-19; cf United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 652-54 (1978)
(examining legislative history to determine whether Mississippi Choctaw Indians should
be included in the federal relationship); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84
(1977) (holding that Congress's plenary power does not preclude the Court from
scrutinizing Indian legislation for violation of equal protection). Evaluating Congress's
ability to confer tribal status, Professor Benjamin observes that "[t]he Supreme Court has
stated that it will give some deference to a federal decision to recognize an Indian tribe but
will make an independent judgment as to whether federal recognition was arbitrary or
irrational." Benjamin, supra note 2, at 603 n.271; see also Van Dyke, supra note 22, at 117
(asserting that the overall theme of the Court's decisions indicates that Congress must be
given flexibility in the governance of natives). The doubts expressed by the Court might
stem from the indefinite origins of the plenary power doctrine. See supra notes 10-12
(discussing theories of congressional empowerment over Indian affairs).
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groups Congress includes in the special relationship will be examined

with greater scrutiny in the future.
The Court's avoidance of these issues and its assumption that the
trust is constitutional permit the survival of the OHA, 71 but its
determination that the definition of "Hawaiians" is racial in nature
will have effects that reach far beyond the invalidation of the voting
method. Presumably, the ancestry requirement constitutes a racial

classification under all circumstances; to interpret the requirement as
legal or political in another context would be inconsistent. The
decision that this definition is race-based indicates that preferential
programs implemented under the suspect terminology-not only in
state legislation but also in numerous federal laws providing benefits
to descendants of the Native Hawaiians'--are subject to a strict
scrutiny standard.73 Courts previously assumed that the nature of the
relationship between Native Hawaiians and the government was
equivalent to that of other native groups and accordingly evaluated

laws pertaining to Native Hawaiians under the more lenient rational
relation test applicable to Indians. 74 Thus, whether the trust and
71. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 521-22 ("[W]e assume the validity of the underlying
administrative structure and trusts, without intimating any opinion on that point.").
72. See supra note 23 (providing examples of federal laws that benefit Native
Hawaiians and their descendants).
73. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 515-17.
74. See Pai 'Ohana v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 680, 697 n.35 (D. Haw. 1995)
(concluding that equal protection analysis is the same for Native Hawaiians and Indians),
affid 76 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996); Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (D. Haw.
1990) ("This court finds applicable the clear body of law surrounding preferences given to
American Indians and finds that the United States' commitment to the native people of
[Hawaii] ... does not create a suspect classification which offends the constitution."),
affd, 940 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1991); Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 640 P.2d
1161, 1168-69 (Haw. 1982) (drawing an analogy between Hawaiian natives and other
aboriginal peoples). But see Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 631 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 n.22 (D. Haw.
1986) (stating that if the claimants had challenged special appropriations for Hawaiian
natives," 'strict scrutiny' might be the appropriate standard"). Other courts had indicated
a willingness to apply the rational basis test to non-tribal Indians generally, but none of
these cases involved an ancestry definition issue. See Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v.
Sec'y of United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 675 F. Supp. 497, 535 (D. Minn.
1987) (declaring that a trust relationship extends to tribal members living together or
individually), affd per curiam, 878 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1989); St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd.
v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1414 (D. Minn. 1983) (holding that the trust doctrine can
extend to Indians individually); Eric v. Sec'y of United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D. Alaska 1978) (finding a trust duty between the government
and individual Alaska Natives). In holding that the use of ancestral criteria likely ceases
to make an Indian group classification political in nature, the Court applied a stricter
interpretation of Mancari'sscope than lower federal court decisions and arguably even its
own earlier decisions, some of which referred to Indians as a race. See, e.g., United States
v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 291 (1909) (affirming federal jurisdiction over members of the
Indian "race"); Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (explaining that the
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other mechanisms established to benefit Hawaiian natives could
survive a strict scrutiny analysis is an open question that the Rice

Court failed to address.'
Unlike the rational relation test, which merely requires that
differential treatment be rationally related to fulfilling the goals of the
federal government-native special relationship, 76 the strict scrutiny
standard requires that racial and ethnic distinctions be upheld "only if

they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
Under the strict scrutiny standard,
governmental interests."'
distinctions based on race are presumed invalid 8 Furthermore,
general claims of past discrimination are insufficient to meet the
compelling interest requirement. 79 Government actors must identify
prior discrimination specifically, enact programs designed expressly to
benefit the likely victims of that particular discrimination, and
demonstrate substantial evidence that remedial action is necessary.80
Exactly what kind of proof is sufficient to satisfy these guidelines is a
question that the Supreme Court has left largely unanswered.8'
Court understood the word "tribe" to mean "a body of Indians of the same or similar
race").
75. Whether a trust exists at all is another question the majority did not reach in Rice.
Justice Stevens did conclude, however, that the programs administered by the OHA are
valid because legislative history, explicitly articulated by Congress's formal apology to
Native Hawaiians for the United States's role in the overthrow of the Hawaiian kingdom,
shows a well-established federal trust relationship. Id.at 532-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But see id.at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no 'trust' for native Hawaiians here
76. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,554-55 (1974).
77. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd.of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280 (1986) (plurality opinion).
78. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-99 (1989); David
Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial
Conservatismor ConservativeJustices?,91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 802 (1991).
79. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99.
80. See id. at 505-07; George R. La Noue, Who Counts?: Determining the Availability
of Minority Businessesfor Public ContractingAfter Croson, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
793,793-94 (1998).
81. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The question of
precisely what interests government may legitimately invoke to justify race-based
classifications is largely unsettled."); Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited:L A Legacy of
Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 CoLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 679, 684
(1995) ("The cases which follow Croson reflect the confusion on the part of both the
courts and the local and municipal governments as to what amount of statistics, written
testimony, and historical evidence is needed to satisfy the ...standard of Croson."); Kim
Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88
GEO. L.J. 2331, 2339-41 (2000) (commenting that neither Adarandnor Croson completely
settled the issue of what strict scrutiny requires in the affirmative action context); Brent E.
Simmons, ReconsideringStrict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 88
(1996) (asserting that lower court decisions in the wake of Croson have been erratic and
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The outlook for programs designed to assist and support Natives2

Hawaiians

is

uncertain

under

the

strict

scrutiny

test.

Unquestionably, America's imperialist overthrow of the Hawaiian
government in 1893 and subsequent seizure of land had a welldocumented, devastating impact on Hawaii's native population. 3
Congressional findings consistently show that Native Hawaiians lag
far behind non-Native Hawaiians in education, health, and income.84
inconsistent due to the Court's failure to make a coherent analysis of strict scrutiny); see
also, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2000)
(accepting the results of a disparity study that found evidence of lending discrimination,
race-based barriers to membership in subcontractors' unions, and bid shopping that
harmed minority-owned businesses in government contracting as sufficient to support a
compelling interest); Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 407-09 (6th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the validity of a disparity study on the basis that it failed to consider that
minorities might be less inclined than non-minorities to seek law enforcement jobs for
reasons unrelated to prior discriminatory practices); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 95255 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down a University of Texas School of Law admissions program
because the school could not completely eliminate societal discrimination as a contributing
cause of the effects it sought to remedy); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia,
963 F.2d 420, 425-27 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting the relevance of statistical evidence to
justify a set-aside program on the grounds that the government's data lacked specificity).
82. In its assessment of Rice, the Ninth Circuit contemplated whether the voting
scheme would withstand strict scrutiny and concluded that, because the restriction was
"rooted in the special trust relationship" and was designed precisely to choose a board
who would best represent the beneficiaries of that trust in furtherance of the state's duties,
it could withstand strict scrutiny. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998).
Contra Benjamin, supra note 2, at 592-96 (concluding that programs for Native Hawaiians
would not pass strict scrutiny). This position assumes that a trust relationship does exist
between Hawaiian natives and the federal government, which the United State Supreme
Court was not willing to concede. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
83. See Rice, 528 U.S. 495, 500-06 (2000); S. REP. No. 106-424, at 62-63 (2000) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y1.1/5:106-424) (detailing the decline of Native Hawaiian culture and society);
Trask, Native HawaiianNationalism,supra note 13, at 17-18 (recounting the devastating
impact of native land dispossession, disease epidemics, and attacks on cultural practices);
see generally RALPH S. KUYKENDALL & A. GROVE DAY, HAwAII: A HISTORY (1964)
(providing a definitive history of the islands). Hawaii's downfall, however, did not happen
solely at the hands of the United States. See NOEL J. KENT, HAWAI'I: ISLANDS UNDER
THE INFLUENCE 29-30 (1983) (describing British, French, and American efforts to
establish dominance in the islands); ROBERT H. MAST & ANNE B. MAST,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF PROTEST IN HAWAI'I 10 (1996) (noting that exploitation by foreign
traders beginning in the 1780s led to Hawaii's loss of control over its economy).
84. See S. REP. No. 106-424, at 34-40 (providing demographics on pervasive problems
in the Native Hawaiian community including inferior health and housing conditions and
low educational performance); 1 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIVE
(Sup. Docs. No.
HAWAIIANS STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 33-139 (1983)
Y3.H31/2:2N21/vl-2) (presenting a demographic profile of Native Hawaiians as compared
to non-Native Hawaiians); see also Draft Bill Entitled The Native Hawaiian Housing
Assistance Act of 1994: HearingBefore the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 2
(1994) (Sup. Does. No. Y4.In2/11:S.Hrg.103-497) (reporting the results of an investigation
documenting that Native Hawaiians represent the highest percentage of the state's
homeless persons and have the "worst housing conditions" in the state); Reauthorization
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These general disparities, however, fail to meet strict scrutiny review
without specific evidence that Native Hawaiians suffered prior
discrimination in particular instances in areas addressed by the
differential treatment programs.85 The breadth and variety of
programs developed for Native Hawaiians would make this a difficult
task in any case. 86 Given the movement toward colorblind standards
exhibited under the Rehnquist Court, 87 Native Hawaiians have cause
for concern that the government cannot adequately justify their
differential treatment, leaving the door open for challenges to any
programs relying on the ancestry requirement to designate
beneficiaries! 8 Because virtually all legislation for Native Hawaiians
of the Native Hawaiian Health CareImprovement Act: HearingBefore Select Comm. on

Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 3 (1992) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.In2/l1:S.Hrg.102-776) (noting the
exceptionally high incidence of mortality, disease, and emotional disorders among the

Native Hawaiian population); Indian Education Act: Hearings on S. 830 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong. 29 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.In2/11:S.Hrg.99-

730) (producing statistical evidence that a disproportionately high percentage of Native
Hawaiians are unemployed or live in poverty).
85. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 594-95 (analyzing the application of strict scrutiny
to programs for Native Hawaiians); Chang, supra note 78, at 836-37 (suggesting that
formal legislative findings of specific past discrimination are a threshold for passing the

strict scrutiny test); see also Kamaki Maunupau, Ho'ohaole Maila 'Ia Kaou-Make Us
into Whites: A Kupuna's Thoughts on Assimilation and Decolonization, in HAWAI'I:
RETURN TO NATIONHOOD, supra note 13, at 44, 47-48 (contrasting the subtle nature of
discrimination against Native Hawaiians with discrimination against African Americans).
86. See supra note 23 (providing examples of federal laws benefiting descendants of
Native Hawaiians).
87. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-15 (1995) (striking down a redistricting
plan that took race into account); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22127 (1995) (requiring federal affirmative action programs to pass strict scrutiny); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-49 (1993) (holding that redistricting statutes that can only be
explained on racial grounds are presumptively unconstitutional); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating colorblindness in
discrimination cases, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy
joining); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Absent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for.., race-based measures, there is simply
no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (observing that the main objective of the Fourteenth Amendment is to eliminate
all government distinctions based on race); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-32
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Constitution requires that government
action be colorblind); see also John Marquez Lundin, The Call for a Color-BlindLaw, 30
COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 407,433 (1997) (asserting that Wygant, Croson, and Adarand
demonstrate that the Court's "view of what constitutes a compelling governmental
purpose sufficient to overcome strict scrutiny is becoming progressively more restrictive").
88. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution isColor-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1991) (criticizing "color-blind constitutionalism" as a tool for perpetuating
white domination); Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 727, 730-31 (1998)
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incorporates the ancestry requirement, all laws that benefit them are
at risk. 9
The loss of special government assistance programs would be
devastating to the Native Hawaiian community. Federal funding and
grants to Hawaiian natives have exceeded $440 million in recent
years, providing capital to improve education, health care, and
housing conditions, and to preserve the native culture and
environment. 90 Scholars who have studied the issue conclude almost
universally that Native Hawaiians deserve some form of reparations
for the harms inflicted by Westerners, 91 and, prior to Rice, most
(charging that that Supreme Court's "color blind" policies have effectively nullified
minority access to the electoral process and eviscerated the equal protection clause);
Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's Commitment to
Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 764 (1996) (describing
recent Court decisions as "enormous setback[s] to minority efforts to achieve equal
opportunity"); see also Benjamin, supra note 2, at 567-68 (identifying a "hostility to racial
classifications" in recent Court decisions). But see Lundin, supra note 87, at 409 (arguing
that "the color-blind law advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia is the best modem
interpretation of the Constitution"). The Rice majority hinted at these sentiments,
expressing fears that upholding the OHA voting scheme might make the law "the
instrument for generating the prejudice and hostility all too often directed against persons
whose particular ancestry is disclosed by their ethnic characteristics and cultural
traditions." 528 U.S. at 517.
89. See supra notes 2, 37 (discussing the definitions of "Native Hawaiian" used in
federal and state legislation).
90. See Pat Omandam, Hawaiian Funding Tops $440 Million, HONOLULU STARBULLETIN, Mar. 20, 2000, http:/starbulletin.com2000/03/20/speciallstory3.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (listing funding amounts for the top programs).
The loss of such a significant amount of funding would reach beyond natives and have a
negative impact statewide. See Jan TenBruggencate, The State of the Hawaiian, THE
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 7, 2001, http://www.honoluluadvertiser.comtspecials/
stateofthehawaiiansfmdex.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (pointing
out that federal money trickles throughout the economy).
91. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 22, at 944 ("[Tlhe history of the United States'
conduct in Hawaii makes a particularly compelling case for redress of claims ... "
NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 34, 78 (asserting that while
Hawaiians' loss of control over their lands and affairs may not be actionable in a court of
law, the loss should be compensated); NIKLAUS R. SCHWEIZER, TURNING TIDE: THE
EBB AND FLOW OF HAWAIIAN NATIONALITY 461 (observing an increasing sentiment
that the Western world owes natives a duty); S. James Anaya, The Native HawaiianPeople
and InternationalHuman Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Pastand ContinuingWrongs,
28 GA. L. REV. 309, 361 (1994) (arguing that the United States has a duty to remedy
human rights violations in Hawaii through reparations, legislation, or other reforms);
Karen N. Blondin, A Case for Reparations for Native Hawaiians,16 HAW. B.J. 13, 30
(1981) (concluding that Native Hawaiians deserve payment for lost lands seized by
Westerners); Noelle M. Kahanu & Jon M. Van Dyke, Native Hawaiian Entitlement to
Sovereignty: An Overview, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 427,444-46 (1995) (advocating the return
of lands held by the federal government to Native Hawaiians); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 477, 520-21 (1998) (explaining why money alone is insufficient to repair the
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considered the special relationship as one means of remediating the
detrimental effects of American imperialism and achieving
sovereignty. 92 Additionally, legislative history of acts concerning
Hawaiian natives strongly indicates that Congress has accepted
responsibility for the harmful effects of the United States'
involvement in the islands and that it recognizes it has a duty to repair
the damage America wrought.93 Now, the problem is how to work

toward fulfilling that goal within the confines prescribed by the Court.
Because of the risks inherent in a challenge to the preferential

scheme under strict scrutiny, Native Hawaiians' major objectives
should include steps to avoid being evaluated under that standard.
The most effective strategy toward achieving this end would be for

Hawaiian natives to define their own membership, eliminating the
state's involvement and bringing them closer to the self-governing

structure of other indigenous groups now judged under the rational
relation test, while simultaneously seeking congressional recognition

of the special relationship.9 4 Accomplishing both of these tasks will
harm done to Hawaiian natives).

92. See Mililani B. Trask, Historicaland ContemporaryHawaiianSelf-Determination:
A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 2:77, 80-88 (1991)

[hereinafter Trask, Hawaiian Self-Determination] (urging formal recognition of Native
Hawaiians for inclusion in the trust relationship); Van Dyke, supra note 22, at 97
(outlining the argument that the government owes Hawaiian natives obligations because it
benefited from the wrongful seizing of land); Charles F. Wilkinson, Land Tenure in the
Pacific: The Context for Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 64 WASH. L. REV. 227, 231-32
(1989) (endorsing equivalent legal treatment for all aboriginal peoples). But see
Benjamin, supra note 2, at 588 (agreeing that the historical mistreatment of Hawaiian
natives is a strong argument for congressional action to remedy the mistakes but
discrediting the special relationship as a means for redress).
93. See, e.g., Joint Resolution (Apology Resolution), Act of Nov. 23, 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) (expressing a "commitment to acknowledge the
ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii" and recognizing that natives
never fully relinquished their sovereignty claims); H.R. REP. No. 66-839, at 4 (1920) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y1.1/2:7653) (testimony of Franklin K. Land, Secretary, Department of the
Interior) (describing Native Hawaiians as "wards ... for whom in a sense we are trustees"
in advocating passage of the HHCA); see also H.R. EXFC. DOc. No. 53-47, at xiv-xvi
(1893) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/2:3224) (statement of Pres. Cleveland) (concluding that the
United States involvement in the overthrow of the Hawaiian government was in violation
of national policy and international law and calling for the restoration of the monarchy).
94. Congressional action is necessary because logistical difficulties and statutory
constraints preclude valid recognition through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. By law, the
BIA can only confer tribal status on groups indigenous to the continental United States.
25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (2000) (setting criteria for tribal recognition). Even if some exception
were made for islanders, the recognition process is time-consuming and requires extensive
resources. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 22, at 357 (blaming protracted evidentiary
review for slow resolution of cases); NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIG-rrs HANDBOOK, supra note
34, at 87 (noting the limited success of the petition process). Further complicating matters,
many Native Hawaiian sovereignty leaders resist BIA involvement on the grounds that the
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be difficult, and success would not guarantee that courts would apply
the minimum rational basis review standard. 95
Recognizing the potentially disastrous consequences for Native
Hawaiian assistance initiatives, Hawaii's congressional delegation
moved quickly to introduce legislation that would, among other

current model vests too much power in the agency at the expense of economic self-

sufficiency. See James Podgers, Greetingsfrom Independent Hawaii,A.B.A. J., June 1997,

at 74, 78 (citing critics' view that current status of American Indians does not provide the
level of autonomy sought by islanders); Haunani-Kay Trask, Tourist, Stay Home: Native
Hawaiians Want Their Land Back, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1993, at 32, 34 (commenting

that federal agencies "short-circuit Indian sovereignty"); see also Robert N. Clinton,

Redressingthe Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Questfor a Decolonized FederalIndian Law,

46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 135-36 (1993) (criticizing the BIA as a remnant of colonialism that
unnecessarily interferes with Indian sovereignty).
95. Although changing the Native Hawaiian definition appears straightforward,
complexities arise from the lack of a coherent native structure existing apart from
government entities. See NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 92

(noting criticism in the Hawaiian community over state involvement in the sovereignty
effort); Benjamin, supra note 2, at 598-601 (warning that any state involvement in
attempts to create a tribe would raise constitutional problems); Trask, Native Hawaiian
Nationalism,supra note 13, at 23-28 (charging that the OHA's dominant role has vested
power in the state and undermined self-determination for Hawaiians). The effects of a
nonsingular structure are evident in the sovereignty movement, which has been slowmoving in part because of disagreement about what form of self-government to pursue.
See MAST & MAST, supra note 83, at 356-60 (posturing that disparities in class and group
identities originating from Western interference are largely responsible for divergent
views on sovereignty); Mindy Pennybacker, Should the Aloha State Say Goodbye? Natives

Wonder, THE NATION, Aug. 12, 1996, at 21, 23-24 (reporting on efforts among at least
sixteen Hawaiian sovereignty and homesteader groups to develop a sovereignty
approach). Natives also have clashed over the requirements for receiving benefits. See
Timothy Egan, Aboriginal Authenticity To Be Decided in a Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,

1990, at A16 (describing the difficulties of determining who has legal native status); see
also Lee Cataluna, Who's More Hawaiian Is Now A Question Of Power, HONOLULU

Jan. 7, 2001, http:llwww.honoluluadvertiser.comlspecials/stateofthe
hawaiians/8cataluna.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("[It] isn't really
about who's welcome in the halau or who gets to give the pule at dinner. We as a society
have answered those questions already. It's about who gets a share of the entitlements.").
Assuming that natives could overcome these obstacles and formulate a definition that
satisfied all groups, they would then have to convince Congress to amend legislation
containing the old definition. Finally, any congressional action conferring Indian status
would be subject to judicial review, and as discussed infra notes 123-24, its validity would
hinge on how broadly the Court reads the "Indian tribes" language in the Indian
Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conveying power to "regulate
Commerce with ... the Indian Tribes"). Cases at the height of the Court's activism in
Indian issues used a wide interpretation. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212-13
(1974) (treating Alaska Natives as "Indians" in discussing rational basis as the proper test
for judicial review); see also Eric v. Sec'y of the United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D. Alaska 1978) (asserting that the trust doctrine applies to all
"Native Americans"). Recent decisions, however, curtail Congress's Commerce Clause
power. See infranotes 128-33 and accompanying text.
ADVERTISER,
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96
objectives, redefine who belongs to the group receiving benefits.

The bill called for a temporary definition of Native Hawaiians-lineal
descendants of native people who resided in the islands before 1893,
the year the United States overthrew the Kingdom of Hawaii--until

a Native Hawaiian governing body, also established by the bill, could
formulate its own definition. 98 The proposed legislation, which was
passed the United States House of Representatives but died in the
Senate, 99 notably retains an ancestry requirement, demonstrating the
challenge facing Native Hawaiians as they attempt to define their
membership to avoid strict scrutiny.

The mere presence of the

ancestry requirement, while suspect, does not necessarily render the
96. See Pat Omandam, Hawaiian Clarification Bill is Planned, HONOLULU STARBULLETIN, Apr. 19, 2000, http:llstarbulletin.com12000/04/19/newslstory7.html (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Within a few weeks of the Rice decision, the state's
congressional delegation established a task force to develop legislation to protect
government programs benefiting Hawaiians. Id. Senators Daniel Akaka and Daniel
Inouye co-sponsored the resulting draft legislation, which was introduced on the Senate
floor in July 2000. S. 2899, 106th Cong. (2000). Representative Neil Abercrombie
sponsored the measure in the House, H.R. 4904, 106th Cong. (2000), without the cosponsorship of fellow Hawaiian Representative Patsy Mink, who initially feared that the
bill's impact would be counterproductive but later supported an amended version. See Pat

Omandam, Mink Says Governing Body Proposed in Akaka Bill Should Be Considered

First,HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. 2,2000, http:llstarbulletin.com/2O00/09/02/news/
story4.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
97. The text of the bill as passed by the House of Representatives read:
[T]he term 'Native Hawaiian' means the indigenous, native people of Hawaii
who are the lineal descendants of the aboriginal, indigenous, native people who
resided in the islands that now comprise the State of Hawaii on or before January
1, 1893, and who occupied and exercised sovereignty in the Hawaiian
archipelago, including the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii, and
includes all Native Hawaiians who were eligible in 1921 for the programs
authorized by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act ... and their lineal
descendants.
H.R. 4904 § 2.
98. S. 2899 § 7. The original version suggested that genealogical records, verification
from Native Hawaiian elders, and church, census or vital statistic records would be the
primary means of establishing lineal descendancy. See id The inclusion of the census data
as adequate proof of Native Hawaiian lineage is particularly strange because ethnic and
racial classifications are self-reported on census forms; persons are free to include
themselves in any category. See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Answers to Frequently Asked
Questions, at http:lwww.doi.govlbialaitodaylq-and~a.html (last modified June 21, 1999)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The version passed in the House
eliminates references to suitable evidentiary material. See H.R. 4904 § 7; supra note 81.
99. 146 CONG. REC. H8152-53 (daily ed. Sept. 26,2000); see Audrey Hudson, House
Passes Bill Bypassing Court on Native Hawaiian Self-Governing,WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2000, at A7; Susan Roth, Native Legislation Dies in U.S. Senate, HONOLULU

Dec. 14, 2000, http:lwww.honoluluadverstiser.com/2000/Dec/14/1214
localnewsl3.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (citing the controversy
over the 2000 Presidential election as a factor in diverting attention from the bill). Senator
Akaka pledged to reintroduce the bill in the 107th Congress. See id.
ADVERTISER,
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definition racially charged; other Native American groups whose
tribal definitions are considered political employ lineal descendancy
and blood quantum requirements.) ° Courts look at the effect of the
definition to gauge whether its intent is primarily racial."' 1 The
designated year post-dates the massive influx of Western immigrants
that began in the 1830s.1°
Not surprisingly, the newcomers'
subsequent intermarriage with Native Hawaiians increased the
number of part-Hawaiians of mixed racial background. This fact
undoubtedly did not elude the bill's sponsors. 1°3 Also, the ultimate
100. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 (1978) (applying the Indian
Reorganization Act's definition of "Indian," which includes the phrase" 'all other persons
of one-half or more Indian blood'" (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1976))); see also, e.g.,
CONST. OF THE CHOCrAW NATION OF OKLA., art. II (including in membership all
Choctaw Indians by blood whose names appear on the 1906 tribal rolls and their lineal
descendants); CONST. OF THE ELY SHOSHONE TRIBE, art. II (defining as eligible members
persons of at least one-quarter degree Shoshone Indian blood who are descendants of
members); CONST. OF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION, art. III (2) (defining as eligible
members tribal members by blood whose names appear on the 1906 final rolls and persons
who are lineal descendants by blood of those whose names appear on the final rolls); REV.
CONST. OF Tim NEZ PERCE TRIBE, art. IV (including within the class of eligible members
children who are of at least one-fourth degree Nez Perce Indian ancestry and are born to a
tribe member); CONST. OF THE SAC AND Fox TRIBE OF INDIANS OF OKLA., art. I
(including in membership all persons of at least one-fourth total combined Sac and Fox
Indian blood with at least one parent who is a member of the Sac and Fox Nation). These
constitutions are available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/const.html (last modified Feb. 2, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Justice Breyer criticized the Native
Hawaiian definition as broad "beyond any reasonable limit" and listed these classifications
as contrary examples, perhaps indicating a willingness to interpret some ancestry
definitions as non-racial in nature. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 526-27 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). That the tribes formulated these classifications of tribal membership
distinguishes them from the classification at issue in Rice because Hawaii's definition
originated from the federal government. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Traditionally,
courts have granted tribes wide leeway to set the terms of their membership. See Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-59 (1978) (invoking tribal power to regulate
internal relations in denying membership to children of females who married outside the
tribe). This distinction, however, would not entirely explain the Court's acceptance in
United States v. John of the federally generated blood-quantum specification in the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA). If Breyer's suggestion that a narrow blood-quantum
qualification renders a federally implemented ancestry-based definition non-suspect is
unacceptable to a majority of the Court, the IRA standard is vulnerable.
101. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 513-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
102. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI'I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF
LAW 86-87 (2000) (documenting the decimation of the Native Hawaiian population).
103. By sidestepping the pre-1778 era of homogeneous racial composition, Native
Hawaiians have a new argument that the revised statute's ancestry requirement is political
and not racial in nature. Nevertheless, a court may interpret this as a superficial change.
Any classification of Hawaiians by descendancy is arguably racial for the same reasons
that a statute granting special benefits to African Americans who could prove
descendancy from slaves would be treated as racial. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 514 (noting that
the voting qualification might still be deemed racially based even if pre-1778 Hawaiian
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goal of the new federal legislation is to empower Native Hawaiians to
define themselves. 1°4 Under the bill, the ancestry-based definition
only applies temporarily until Native Hawaiians themselves define
whom the trust shall benefit. 5

inhabitants had been more ethnically diverse); Benjamin, supra note 2, at 571 n.151 ("[I]t
seems highly unlikely that a court would find that the addition of a nonracial criterion to
an explicitly racial definition would thereby cure the definition of its racial character
"); Williams, supra note 69, at 807 ("It cannot be ...that the simple addition of a non....
suspect trait to a suspect one yields a non-suspect class."). With the change of political
parties in the White House, the ancestry qualification is likely to face opposition from
another front. The previous Republican administration described the Native Hawaiian
definition as a "race-based classification [that] cannot be derived from the constitutional
authority granted to the Congress and the executive branch to benefit native Americans as
member of tribes." President'sStatement on Signing the Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable
HousingAct, 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1699, 1701 (Nov. 28, 1990). President George H.W. Bush
also directed the Department of Justice and the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to prepare corrective legislation. Id
104. The bill provided for the development of a roster by a commission of the
Department of the Interior of certified "Native Hawaiians" who want to participate in the
reorganization of a Native Hawaiian government. See S. 2899, 106th Cong. § 7 (2000); S.
REP. No. 106-424, at 39-40 (2000) (Sup. Does. No. Y1.1/5:106-424). Adult members on
the roll would be able to elect representatives to a Native Hawaiian Interim Governing
Council that would be responsible for promulgating governing documents that would
include a Native Hawaiian definition. Id.
105. The descendancy requirement appears entrenched in how the law defines Native
Hawaiians for sovereignty purposes. Absent a significant shift in policy prompted by the
Rice decision, the descendancy requirement is likely to remain part of any definition,
although which year it will specify is uncertain. See S.2899, 106th Cong. § 2(6)(A) (2000).
The blood quantum requirement, however, is not generally accepted. See Timothy Egan,
Aboriginal Authenticity to be Decided in a Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990, at A16 ("For
years, Congress and the courts have been grappling with the definition."); Susan Essoyan,
Voters OK Plan to Expand Native Hawaiian Category, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990, at A4
(quoting an OHA trustee who criticized the blood-quantum requirement as a means of
dividing Hawaiian natives into "'two separate classes,'" with one group eligible for
benefits and the other not); Native Hawaiians Vote on Sharing a Trust's Riches, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1989, at Bl (noting opposition to the definition change from critics who
contended that the benefits were already spread too thin). The OHA has referred to the
blood quantum requirement as the "single most divisive issue in the Hawaiian
community." Price v. Akaka, 3 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1993). Controversy over the
definition also leads to the troubling prospect of conflicting claims as to which group is the
"proper" beneficiary of the trust relationship. This precise issue was litigated in Hoohuli
v. Ariyoshi, 631 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1986), in which a group of taxpayers challenged
the OHA definition of "Hawaiian" as unconstitutional because the absence of a blood
quantum requirement made it overly inclusive. The Court rejected the claim. See id. at
1163. In an analogous case, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), two
entities with tribal ties each claimed to be the legal successor to treaty rights. Id at 409
n.10 One was a corporation that had received all of the tribal assets previously held in
trust by the United States, while the other was a corporation made up of the members of
the tribe. See id.Because resolution of the issue was not required, the Court specifically
reserved the question of which party could assert the rights. See id.
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Beyond the implications for Hawaii, the Rice Court's decision to
classify the ancestry requirement as race-based signals trouble for
other Native American groups whose status is based primarily on
ancestry requirements, rather than tribal status. The decision is
particularly significant for Alaska Natives, whose history largely
parallels that of the Native Hawaiians. 0 6 The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA),' ° the major piece of legislation
governing Alaska Natives, uses a blood quantum requirement to
define "Native," but also provides discretion to accommodate those
persons who do not meet the criteria.0 8 The Rice majority opinion
106. In addition to having natives without traditional tribal structures, see supra note
29, both Alaska and Hawaii became territories of the United States after Congress
discontinued making treaties with Indians. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 2, at 208 (noting that 1871 marked the end of the treaty period); Mitchell, supra
note 3, at 360-62 (noting a lack of recognition of tribal sovereignty, treaties, or a special
relationship with Alaska Natives); Van Dyke, supra note 22, at 121-23 (observing that the
post-treaty era resulted in the failure to develop documents for Native Hawaiians similar
to those regulating relationships with other native groups). Because courts viewed treaty
obligations as one of the elements giving rise to the federal-Indian special relationship, the
absence of treaties in the cases of Hawaii and Alaska cast doubt on their claims of a
similar relationship. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 208 n.4;
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 359-62, 394 (reporting on efforts of Alaskan lobbyists who
opposed the inclusion of the natives in the special relationship to prevent their
subordination). But see N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that trust responsibility can arise from a statute, a treaty, or an executive order);
Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975)
(observing that the enactment of a statute on a tribe's behalf is sufficient to establish the
special relationship); Eric v. Sec'y of the United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 464
F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Alaska 1978) (ruling that the nonexistence of a treaty does not affect
the existence of a trust relationship).
107. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1629g (West 1986 & Supp. 2000). ANCSA demonstrates
that whatever the similarities Alaska and Hawaii natives share, Congress's policies toward
each group differ considerably. Legislation referring to the Alaska Native "Indians"
appeared as early as 1934 in the Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U.S.C. § 473 (1994). Since
the passage of ANCSA, Alaska Natives have been included as beneficiaries in virtually all
Indian legislation, and the judiciary has affirmed the federal government's continuing trust
obligation to them. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,231-36 (1974) (implying that Alaska
Natives are "Indians" for constitutional purposes); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 953 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (observing that the United States' trustee relationship with Alaska
Natives remains intact); People of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C.
1979) (imposing a trust duty to protect subsistence hunting rights); Eric v. Sec'y of United
States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D. Alaska 1978) (holding that
the obligation is limited only by common law principles and not by statutory language);
Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1371, 1378-80 (D.D.C. 1973) (allowing a cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty). But see Van Dyke, supra note 22, at 126-28
(arguing that the strong parallels between Alaska Natives' and Native Hawaiians' dealings
with the federal government preclude treating the groups differently for purposes of the
special relationship).
108. For tribal purposes, an Alaska "Native" is "a person of one-fourth degree or more
Alaska Indian ...[or one] who is regarded as an Alaska Native by the Native village or
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does not speculate about whether the inclusion of a discretionary

clause would alter its holding. The Court's emphasis on the Fifteenth
Amendment violation, however, suggests that the majority found the
ancestry requirement particularly offensive because of its proximity
Under
to a statewide, state-controlled voting scheme.'"
circumstances not involving electoral fairness concerns, the Court
might be less inclined to find that the ancestry requirement is
equivalent to a race-based restriction." 0 If so, tribes whose governing
bodies are far removed from the state and whose affairs are discretely
contained have little to fear from Rice, even if those tribes'
membership standards include lineal descendant provisions."'
Because few tribes face the Native Hawaiians' predicament of
depending on a non-tribal entity to manage their affairs-particularly

Native group of which he claims to be a member and whose father or mother is ...
regarded as Native by any village or group." 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b). A Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals case predating Rice held that the blood quantum requirement "does not
detract from the political nature of the classification." Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162,1168-69 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing the absence of other
practicable methods, like tribal rolls or proximity to reservations, for determining
membership). One aspect of the Alaska Native definition distinguishing it from its Native
Hawaiian counterpart is that membership can be based on non-ancestral factors, which
supports its treatment as politically based.
109. The state-developed voting scheme instituted under the OHA is an anomaly
among forms of tribal governance. See NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra
note 34, at 18-20. Other natives' tribal elections are administered by tribal bodies. See
generally HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 246-57 (describing
various methods of tribal organization). As the Court reiterated in Rice, the Fifteenth
Amendment exists to "reaffirm the equality of the races at the most basic level of the
democratic process, the exercise of the voting franchise," when public issues are at stake.
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000). While the Constitution's Bill of Rights does
not apply to American Indian governing bodies, see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384
(1896), the courts have stepped into tribal matters when voting concerns were at issue,
even when only tribal members were affected. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d
658,662-63 (8th Cir. 1973) (determining that the one-person, one-vote standard applied in
a particular tribal election through general provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303) (1994));
Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973) (same); White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973) (same); Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455
F.2d 698, 700 (1972) (upholding jurisdiction to hear an equal protection complaint
stemming from tribal candidacy disqualification).
110. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 527 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that Hawaii's definitions
do not necessarily violate the Constitution when considered outside the voting context).
111. See id at 520 ("If a non-Indian lacks a right to vote in tribal elections, it is for the
reason that such elections are the internal affair of a quasi-sovereign."). The Court also
has upheld the legitimacy of tribal councils and affirmed their power to enact ordinances,
including those applicable to non-Indians. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471
U.S. 195,201 (1985).
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the election of tribal leaders or trustees-the fallout from Rice is
likely to be limited.12
The Native Hawaiians' dilemma in constructing a definition that
will survive strict scrutiny is moot, however, if the judiciary refuses to
include them within the special relationship; inclusion in the
relationship is a threshold prerequisite for application of the rational
relation test."3 While the Rice Court did not rule on that issue, the
majority acknowledged uncertainty as to whether the federal
government has recognized the status of Native Hawaiians as
equivalent to that of Indians in organized tribes."4 The potential
implications of the Court's pronouncement cast doubt on whether
Hawaiian natives will ever be able to claim membership in the special
relationship.
The Native Hawaiians' relationship with the United States
government does not closely resemble that of any American
Indians." 5

Dealings between American Indians and the federal

government were akin to a "government-to-government" interaction,
112. In addition to Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, who manage their affairs through a
corporate structure established by ANCSA, may also be potentially affected. Governance
of these corporations, however, is not through a state agency but by Indian groups or
villages organized into a corporate form. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607 (setting standards
for the creation and provision of benefits). Such formal organization and recognition does
not necessarily insulate Alaska Natives from questions regarding their ability to claim the
special relationship. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 602 ("[T]he constitutional status of
these corporations for purposes of equal protection analysis is not clear.").
113. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (stating that the outcome of
the case hinged on the unique status of "Indian tribes").
114. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-19.
115. The major factor distinguishing Native Hawaiians from other indigenous groups is
that Western nations treated the ruling monarchy as a foreign sovereign. See S. EXEC.
Doc. No. 52-77, at 40-41 (1893) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/2:3062) (statement of Sec'y of State
Webster) (affirming the United States' official position that the existing island government
should be respected); Dep't of the Interior & Dep't of Justice, From Mauka to Makai:
The River of Justice Must Flow Freely 22 (Oct. 23, 2000), at http://www.doi.gov
nativehawaiians/pdf/1023fin.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter From Mauka to Makai] (finding that the existence of numerous treaties with
America, as well as at least fifteen other countries, demonstrate that the United States
considered the Hawaiian kingdom an independent nation). As Felix S. Cohen, the preeminent scholar in Indian law, points out, the recognition of Hawaiians as an equal player
in foreign affairs contrasts markedly with the view of tribes in the continental United
States, whose sovereign status "was considered subordinate to 'discovering' nations."
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 799 (quoting Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)); see also NATIVE HAWAIAN RIGHTS
HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 77 ("Indian nations had some, but not all, of the aspects of
sovereignty; the Kingdom of Hawai'i possessed all of the attributes of sovereignty and was
so recognized by the world community of sovereign nations."); PRUCHA, supra note 5, at
39 ("Procedures for dealing with established foreign nations were quite different from
those for dealing with the Indian nations . ").

2001]

NATIVE HAWAIIAN STATUS

841

which assisted in preserving tribal sovereignty." 6 In contrast, the
United States' treatment of Hawaii is more accurately described as
colonialism, marked by deliberate efforts to "civilize" the natives by
subordinating their political infrastructure to purge them of their
cultural practices." 7 These efforts culminated in the overthrow of the
native government; accordingly, few vestiges of their sovereign

116. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 232 ("I[T]he United
States from the beginning permitted, then protected, the tribes in their continued internal
government."). Although whites commonly disregarded Indians rights, the existence of
treaties provided a form of protection for American Indians by granting political
recognition, verifying land ownership, and strengthening autonomy. See PRUCHA, supra
note 5, at 2-5 (asserting that in many cases "recognition of independence meant more to
Indian groups than did their lands"). Reservations served a similar purpose by
encouraging a "measured separatism" desired by tribes as well as the federal government.
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 32 (1987)
(describing the reservation system as a means of establishing "islands of tribalism largely
free from interference by non-Indians or future state governments"). Notwithstanding the
racist motives behind its creation, the reservation system increased tribes' ability to retain
control over their internal affairs and preserve their cultural practices. See id. at 52-54
(arguing that reservations to some extent insulated tribes from the threat of assimilation).
This is not to understate the horrors that the United States inflicted on American Indians
or deny that assimilation policies undermined tribal autonomy. See, e.g., Indian Removal
Act, Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, §§ 1-8, 4 Stat. 411, 411-12 (forcing tribes to relocate in
the West); ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., Now THAT THE BUFFALO'S GONE 154 (1982)
("[T]ribes were cheated and robbed, their assets were mishandled and subjected to fraud,
and it became a habit not even to inform them of developments and agreements made in
their name that would adversely affect their resources."); Clinton, supra note 94, at 102
(noting that mandatory off-reservation boarding schools for Indian adolescents played a
significant role in wiping out tribal cultural and religious practices). The failure to commit
to a policy of complete assimilation combined with periodic efforts to bolster Indian selfdetermination, however, helped assure the survival of some tribal government structure.
See Clinton, supra note 94, at 123 ("Indian resistance and resentment to ... federal
colonialist practices tend to strengthen, rather than diminish, Indian peoplehood and their
own sense of political autonomy.") The diametric approaches of assimilation and
separatism-the latter virtually absent from the Native Hawaiian experience-have
uniquely characterized the federal-Indian relationship. See WILKINSON, supra, at 13-14
(characterizing relations with Indians as a pattern of conflicting approaches); John W.
Ragsdale, Jr., Anasazi Jurisprudence,22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 393, 434 (1998) (describing
assimilation from two perspectives: the promotion of societal acceptance and economic
independence, and a "cultural annihilation that approached genocide"); Sharon O'Brien,
Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship? 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1465-66 (1991) (recounting continual shifts between
assimilation and separatism).
117. See MERRY, supra note 102, at 23-24 (describing the central goals of American
colonialism as assimilation and incorporation by converting Hawaiian natives into
"civilized" Christian people); Maunupau, supra note 85, at 44-46 (assessing the negative
impact of American influence on native culture); see also TOM COFFMAN, NATION
WITHIN: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S ANNEXATION OF THE NATION OF HAWAI'I 119-27
(1998) (recounting the events leading up to the American overthrow of the Native
Hawaiian government).
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structure survived," 8 and what did remain bore little resemblance to a
"tribe."" 9 The significance of these factors, brought to the forefront
by Rice, is that the lack of a tribal structure has a bearing on whether
a special relationship exists with Native Hawaiians under existing law,
and whether Congress has the authority to include them within that
relationship. 2 0
Prior to Rice, lower courts largely operated on the assumption
that, because the experience of Native Hawaiians closely paralleled
that of American Indians, Native Hawaiians should be included
within the special relationship even though their structure was not
"tribal.'1' The courts based this view on legislation indicating that
118. As one scholar observes, Indians were displaced from entire regions, but
Hawaiians "lost an entire country" and their government when supporters of American
annexation seized power through an armed invasion and forced the Queen to abdicate.
See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 22, at 947-48 (describing the extent of U.S. government
involvement in the takeover); SCHWEIZER, supra note 91, at 283-90 (documenting the
careful planning behind efforts to take control of the islands); see also Joint Resolution
(Apology Resolution), Act of Nov. 23, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993)
(acknowledging the illegality of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii by American
insurrectionists); KENT, supra note 83, at 43-45 (characterizing sovereignty as a "fagade"
in light of the power foreign plantation owners wielded starting in the mid-1800s).
Following the fall of the monarchy, Americans ruled Hawaiians through a provisional
government unit, placing such stringent qualifications for voting and holding office that
few natives were eligible. See NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at
13-15 (detailing Hawaiian protests of the overthrow); Trask, Native Hawaiian
Nationalism, supra note 13, at 15-18 (observing that U.S. actions rendered Hawaiian
natives "a conquered people, their lands and culture subordinated to another nation").
119. At the time of Captain Cook's arrival in 1778, Native Hawaiians shared common
cultural traits and practices but were governed under four separate kingdoms. R.
TABRAH, HAWAII, A HISTORY 13-14 (1984). The kingdoms later were united into a
single monarchy under King Kamehameha I. Id One could view the movement away
from more traditional forms of native government as a strategy of self-preservation. As
Sally Engle Merry explains, "[c]onstructing a society that appeared 'civilized' to the
Europeans in nineteenth-century terms clearly helped to win acceptance from those
European powers whose recognition conferred sovereignty.... Elites engaging in
'civilizing' their nations did so because they saw this as a form of resistance to
imperialism." MERRY, supra note 102, at 13; see also NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
HANDBOOK, supra note 34 at 9-11 (observing how Hawaii's fight to protect itself from
Western dominance led to drastic changes in the structure of its political institutions);
Trask, Hawaiian Self-Determination, supra note 92, at 84 (commenting that Hawaiians
"historically have not organized as tribes").
120. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,518-19 (2000).
121. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1553-54 (D. Haw. 1997) (finding that a
broad definition of "tribe" is appropriate because statutory requirements unnecessarily
limit federal recognition); Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-13 (D. Haw. 1990)
("Although Hawaiians are not identical to the American Indians whose lands are
protected by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the court finds that for purposes of equal
protection analysis, the distinction ...is meritless."); Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home
Lands, 640 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Haw. 1982) ("Essentially, we are dealing with relationships
between the government and aboriginal people. Reason thus dictates that we draw the
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the federal government has obligations toward the Native
Hawaiians"z and on precedent from the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts indicating that Congress's power with respect to
"Indians"'" is not limited to members of recognized tribes. 24 The
analogy between native Hawaiian homesteaders and other native Americans."); see also
Neil M. Levy, Native HawaiianLand Rights, 63 CAL. L. REv. 848, 875-76 (1975) (arguing
for legal treatment of Native Hawaiians analogous to that of American Indians).
122. See, e.g., Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 9202,
108 Stat. 3518, 3796 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (recognizing "the special
relationship which exists between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people");
Joint Resolution (Apology Resolution), Act of Nov. 23, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107
Stat. 1510 (1993) (apologizing to Native Hawaiians for the United States' role in
overthrowing their government and supporting "reconciliation efforts"); Act to Provide
for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union (Admission Act), Pub. L. No. 863, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959) (conveying land to a "public trust" to benefit Native
Hawaiians); Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-34, ch. 42, 42 Stat.
108 (1921) (analogizing the Act's provisions to other enactments granting "Indians ...
special privileges in obtaining and using the public lands"). The Rice Court also noted that
federal government programs specially intended to benefit the island natives have existed
since at least 1898. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 505. Justice Stevens' dissent went
further, asserting that congressional history, explicitly articulated by the formal apology to
Native Hawaiians, shows a well-established federal trust relationship. Id.at 532-34
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Briefs filed by the United States government and the Hawaiian congressional
delegation contended that the framers of the United States Constitution used the terms
"Indian" and "aboriginal" synonymously and that "Indian tribe" thus describes any
distinct group of indigenous people. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 12, Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818); Brief of Amicus Curiae Hawai'i
Congressional Delegation at 6-7, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818).
Historical evidence indicates that the language originally proposed for the Constitution
used "Indians" without a reference to tribes. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). Correspondence between James
Monroe and James Madison concerning the construction of what became the Indian
Commerce Clause referred to "Indians not members of any State." 2 THE FOUNDERS'
CONsTrrurION 529 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
124. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 (1978) (holding that the Indian
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, § 19,48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified in part at
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) applies to any person of at least fifty percent
"Indian blood"); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 77 (1977) (listing
congressional treatment, not just official recognition, as determinative); United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (holding that the government has "the power and the
duty of ...care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its
borders"); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162,
1162-70 (9th Cir. 1982) (addressing whether the rational relation standard extends to
programs for individual Indians); cf United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886)
(indicating that Indians have a quasi-sovereign status "when they preserved their tribal
relations"). Part of the confusion surrounding what constitutes a "tribe" stems from the
absence of any precise federal statutory or common law test. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, at 3 (observing that "[t]here is no single federal statute
defining an Indian tribe for all purposes"); Quinn, supra note 4, at 334-35 (noting that
federal law and policy left "Indian" and "tribe" undefined until the late 1800s); see
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261,266 (1901) (interpreting "Indian tribe" to mean "a
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Rice majority, however, expressly avoided addressing whether
Congress has settled the status of Native Hawaiians. l 25 Thus, the
lower courts' analysis is not necessarily incorrect, but it is far from
conclusive. Until Congress officially pronounces the extent of its
obligations, any claim the Native Hawaiians have to the special
relationship is tenuous at best. Legislative efforts are under way to
clarify and correct this problem, 126 but the Rice Court provided
troubling indications that congressional recognition might not resolve
the issue. 27

By noting that Congress's authority to treat Native Hawaiians in
the same manner as Indian tribes "is a matter of some dispute,"' 2 the
body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership
or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory").
Official federal tribal recognition can come from Congress or from executive branch
agencies such as the BIA and the Department of the Interior. 25 C.F.R. §§ 83-84 (2000);
see L.R. Weatherhead, What is an "Indian Tribe"?-The Question of Tribal Existence, 8
AM. IND. L. REv. 1, 8 (1980) ("Recognition is shown by some treaty, agreement,
"). Under modem legislation, an "Indian tribe"
executive order, or course of dealings ....
is often defined as a "tribe, band, nation or other organized group or community... which
is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians." Indian Self-Determination Act, 25
U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Such a definition leaves much of the
responsibility for determining Indians' eligibility for benefits to the Department of the
Interior. See Weatherhead, supra, at 14-15 (citing similar statutory language in the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (1994); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25
U.S.C. § 1452(c) (1994); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994
& Supp. IV 1998); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1994)).
125. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 518.
126. See 146 CONG. REc. S7394-95 (daily ed. July 21, 2000) (statement of Sen. Akaka)
(stressing the need for legislation to secure a government-to-government relationship
between Native Hawaiians and the United States). The Executive Branch also became
involved, with two cabinets issuing a report on reconciliation that recommends granting
Native Hawaiians control over their affairs within the framework of federal law. See From
Mauka to Makai, supra note 115, at 3-4. Among the report's main proposals are the
enactment of federal legislation to clarify Native Hawaiians' political status, the
establishment of an office within the Department of the Interior to address Native
Hawaiian issues, and the creation of a Native Hawaiian Advisory Committee that would
work with the Department of the Interior on land management issues. d
127. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 518; see also Benjamin, supra note 2, at 598-611 (suggesting
that constitutional concerns could preclude any possibility that a federally recognized or
created Hawaiian native body would fall within the protected relationship).
128. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518. As the Court acknowledged, embarking on this inquiry
would require resolving issues of "considerable moment and difficulty." Id At the very
least, the answer would require some pronouncement on the extent of the congressional
"plenary power" over Indians under the Commerce Clause. Recent cases curtailing
Congress's Commerce Clause power have been aimed primarily at regulation of interstate
commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 548, 567-68 (1995). But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996)
(holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant authority to Congress to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). Other Commerce
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Court suggests that any provision seeking to secure the Native
Hawaiians' sovereign status is vulnerable to challenge on the basis
29
that "creating" a tribe falls outside the powers granted to Congress.
Should the Court decide to confront this question in a future case, it
would mark a dramatic departure from prior case law that grants
Congress substantial power over Native American affairs.Y0 In
particular, judicial review of power regarding the determination of
tribal status, which was previously seen as a political issue properly
left to Congress or the Executive Branch, would deviate drastically
from previous policy.' 3 ' In leaving the underlying trust structure
Clause powers-regulation of commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes-are areas
traditionally of less concern to the states. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133 (5th ed. 1995) (observing that, even during periods of debate
over the limits of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, "there was no
serious advocacy of restrictions on the federal powers in these other [commerce] areas
.... [T]he Justices have never recognized any important or legitimate state interest in
foreign affairs or dealings with American Indians."); cf David H. Getches, Conqueringthe
CulturalFrontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1573, 1625-29 (1996) (denouncing recent Court decisions that consider state
interests in tribal sovereignty issues as an abandonment of firmly established principals in
Indian law). Because Indian lands are necessarily within state borders, the opportunity for
tension between states and tribes is omnipresent.
129. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28,46 (1913) (stating that Congress cannot
include a group in the special relationship by arbitrarily labeling it a tribe); see also United
States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926) (citing Sandoval); Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 582 n.3 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (explaining that a tribe must be something more than a private,
voluntary organization).
130. See Sandoval,231 U.S. at 46 (observing that Congress's power includes authority
to decide when and to what extent it shall recognize a particular Indian community as a
dependent tribe under its guardianship); In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 75657 (1867) (stating that courts will accord substantial weight to federal recognition of a
tribe); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S (3 Wall.) 407, 418-20 (1865) (explaining that
whether a group is a tribe is primarily a question for Congress); see also Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975) (noting that legislation conferring benefits or
protection on Indians is to be construed liberally in their favor); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (same); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (ruling that
only Congress can determine when a special relationship ceases); Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221
U.S. 286, 315 (1911) (same); Weatherhead, supra note 124, at 8 ("The courts essentially
accept the judgment of Congress or Interior that an Indian group is a tribe, as they do in
other matters involving political questions.").
131. See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1938) ("Congress alone has
the right to determine, the manner in which this country's guardianship over the Indians
shall be carried out .... "); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the Government."); HANDBOOK OF INDIAN
LAW, supra note 2, at 3 ("When Congress or the Executive has found that a tribe exists,
courts will not normally disturb such a determination."). But see Sandoval,231 U.S. at 46
("Congress may [not] bring a community or body of people within the range of this power
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intact, the majority exhibited some willingness to entertain the

possibility that Native Hawaiians merit inclusion within the special
relationship. 132 The Court provided few clues, however, as to whether
it would maintain its deferential stance toward Congress on matters
regarding Indians or whether it would employ a stricter standard of
would
review, making it impossible to determine whether the Court
1 33
affirm or invalidate a statute recognizing a trust relationship
Native Hawaiians favoring special relationship status may take
heart in the Court's decision to assume the validity of OHA and other
programs that operate to their benefit, but they must recognize that
the relief might be temporary.TM If the Court implements a new
standard of review and declares that the federal government may not
legislate Native Hawaiians into membership of "unique obligation"
beneficiaries, preferential programs based on a trust relationship will
be prohibited. 35 Until the Court rules on the scope of congressional
authority over the status of Native Americans-which it may never
do-Native Hawaiians nevertheless can take steps to minimize the
negative impact of the Rice ruling. A look at the immediate impact
and response to Rice and some proposals aimed at helping Native
Hawaiians move toward their goal of sovereignty demonstrates how
Native Hawaiians are beginning to proceed.

").
by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe ....
132. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 521-22 ("[W]e assume the validity of the underlying structure
").
and trusts ....
133. Efforts to limit Congress's authority to deal with tribes would conform with the
recent trend of the Rehnquist Court, widely denounced by Indian law scholars, to turn
away from core principles of Indian jurisprudence. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 886 (1990) (abandoning the requirement that a state must have a compelling
interest to regulate religious use of peyote in the Native American Church); Clinton, supra
note 69, at 93-94 (criticizing the Court for renouncing its traditional countermajoritarian
role of protecting Indians from state intrusions upon tribal sovereignty); Getches, supra
note 128, at 1573-74 (commenting on a disturbing departure from the court's traditional
role "as the conscience of federal Indian law, protecting tribal powers and rights at least
against state action"); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's
Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 358, 361 (1992) (charging that the Court has extended "the racist legacy
brought by Columbus to the New World of the use of law as an instrument of racial
domination and discrimination against indigenous tribal peoples' rights of selfdetermination").
134. Lawsuits in the wake of Rice challenge the constitutionality of the OHA and
preference programs for Hawaiian natives. See Barrett v. Hawaii, No. 1:2000cv00645 (D.
Haw. filed Oct. 3, 2000); Carroll v. Nakatani, No. 1:2000cv00641 (D. Haw. filed Oct. 2,
2000).
135. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,555 (1974).
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Following Rice, the Hawaii Legislature amended its statutes to
open the OHA election to all eligible voters. 6 Expanding voter
eligibility to the general population was a quick and easy response to
avoid the Fifteenth Amendment violation identified by the Supreme
Court. It was not, however, the best way to promote sovereignty for
Native Hawaiians because it potentially places a substantial amount
137
of control over their affairs in the hands of non-Native Hawaiians.
A better short-term solution would be appointment of OHA board
members through an application process, which would allow greater
scrutiny over those members and ensure that their interests were
aligned with the trust's stated purpose of improving conditions for
Native Hawaiians. 38 One of the benefits of temporarily appointing
136. Act of April 26, 2000, No. 59, § 2, 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws. 115, 116 (extending
OHA electoral eligibility to all voters in the state), amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 13D-3
(1993 & Supp. 1999). The trustee membership criteria is still in transition. Act of April
26, 2000, No. 59, § 1, 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws. 115, 115 (restricting seats on the OHA board
to Hawaiians), amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 13D-2 (1993 & Supp. 1999). The United
States District Court issued a preliminary injunction permitting non-Hawaiians to join the
OHA trustee board race. See Pat Omandam, OHA Seats Still Open to All, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. 9, 2000, http:llstarbulletin.com12000/O9/09/news/Story2.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Governor Cayetano also declared his belief
that the Rice decision rendered OHA board seats vacant because the election was invalid.
See Yasmin Anwar, After a Year of Turmoil, OHA Faces More Trials, HONOLULU
Jan. 7, 2001, http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/specialsIstateofthe
ADVERTISER,
hawaiians/2oha.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The incumbent board
successfully defended their posts before the Supreme Court of Hawaii. Office of
Hawaiian Affairs v. Cayetano, 6 P.3d 799, 806-07 (Haw. 2000). In a surprise move, all
nine members resigned from the board the day before the decision was handed down in a
sign of solidarity. Pat Omandam & Rosemarie Bernardo, OHA Trustees Resign,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. 8, 2000, http:l/starbulletin.com/2000/09/08/news/
storyl.htnl (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
137. Because Native Hawaiians constitute just twenty percent of the state population,
S. REP. No. 106-424, at 36-37 (2000) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:106-424), they are unable to
wield sufficient voting power to guarantee substantial representation on the OHA board.
138. States commonly employ appointed boards to assist in governing, particularly in
areas in which specialized knowledge is advantageous. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-1386(B) (West 1995) (agriculture employment relations board); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 17-2-201(2) (2000) (parole board); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-350 (1999) (transportation
board). Another advantage of an appointed board is that it could be structured as a
public-private entity, with appointees from designated Native Hawaiian groups as well as
members representing the general public. See, e.g., U.F.W. v. Ariz. Agric. Empl. Rels.
Bd., 727 F.2d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming the constitutionality of a state
employment relations board consisting of two members appointed from labor groups, two
members appointed from agricultural employers, and three members representing the
general public). Several states have established commissions specifically to address
matters concerning Native Americans, with representatives selected by designated tribal
groups. See ALA. CODE § 41-9-708(b) (2000) (establsing the Alabama Indian Affairs
Commission, consisting of seven representatives chosen by the governor based on
recommendations submitted by each of the seven recognized groups); MASS. ANN. LAWS
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the OHA trustees is flexibility; membership may include individuals
who are not statutorily defined Hawaiians without severely
compromising sovereignty goals. 139 As a long-term solution, however,
board appointment risks undermining the ability of Native Hawaiians
to govern themselves.14° If the appointment process is controlled by
ch. 6A, § 8A (Law. Co-op. 1998) (establishing the Commission on Indian Affairs,
consisting of seven members appointed by the governor); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.547(101)
(Michie 2000) (establishing the Indian Affairs Commission, consisting of eleven members,
nine of whom must have a quarter Indian blood and at least two recommended by an
intertribal council); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-217 (1999) (establishing a coordinator of
Indian affairs to be appointed from a list of five qualified applicants agreed upon by tribal
councils in the state); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:16A-53 (West Supp. 2000) (establishing the
Commission on Native American Affairs, consisting of two members each appointed on
recommendation of three state-recognized tribes); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-407 (1999)
(establishing the Commission of Indian Affairs, including 19 representatives selected by
tribal or community consent from Indian groups recognized by the state); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 74 § 1201 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (establishing the Oklahoma Indian Affairs
Commission, consisting of twenty members, all of whom must be enrolled in one of thirtynine state tribal governments); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-138.1 (Michie 1998) (establishing the
Council on Indians, consisting of representatives from eight tribes recognized by the state
and two representatives from the Indian population at large). If Hawaii adopted a similar
scheme, members could be chosen from among the diverse groups advocating different
forms of sovereignty for Hawaii. See infra note 145. The Hawaii legislature could change
the structure of the board by further amendments to section 13D-1 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes.
139. Examples of non-Hawaiians who might add valuable perspective to the board
include Hawaiian studies scholars, native policy experts, non-Hawaiians whose family
members are overwhelmingly Hawaiian, descendants of natives who consider themselves
Native Hawaiians but who fall outside the blood quantum requirement, and others with a
compelling interest in working toward sovereignty. Through the selection process, their
seats could be limited to a minority of the membership so they would not dominate the
OHA governing scheme. Of course, an appointed board also must comply with equal
protection standards. See Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (holding that a
requirement limiting appointments to a government advisory board to owners of real
property violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
140. A permanent appointment scheme runs the risk of overly politicizing the process.
For instance, a governor or legislature hostile to the Native Hawaiian cause could hold up
appointments or attempt to load the board with appointees with anti-sovereignty views.
Potential problems inherent in board appointments are illustrated by the case of Hawaii's
Bishop Estate, a $10 billion public land trust whose trustees are appointed by Hawaii
Supreme Court Justices. See Martin Kasindorf, In Hawaii,a Loss of Trust in Once-Sacred
Estate, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1997, at 5A, 1997 WL 7019654. Alleged mismanagement
and improper use of funds prompted investigations by the IRS and the state attorney
general, leading to the indictment of several trustees. See id.; see also Judge Robert
Mahealani M. Seto & Lynne Marie Kohm, Of Princesses, Charities, Trustees, and
Fairytales: A Lesson of the Simple Wishes of PrincessBernice PauahiBishop, 21 U. HAW.
L. REV. 393, 395 n.18 (1999) (listing examples of trustee indiscretion). Critics have
complained that the trusteeships, which carry a yearly compensation of just less than $1
million, often go to political insiders,.creating an appearance of impropriety. See Hazel
Beh, Why the JusticesShould Stop Appointing Bishop Estate Trustees, 21 U. HAW. L. REV.
659, 662 (1999) (arguing that the appointment process undermines public confidence in
the judicial system).
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non-Native Hawaiians, someone outside the historically oppressed
group is effectively exercising authority, which is precisely the
141
situation Native Hawaiians have been struggling to overcome.
In any case, a structure aimed at achieving maximum autonomy
for Native Hawaiians necessarily must eliminate the State of Hawaii's
142 Reduction of state
intervention to the greatest extent possible.
involvement accomplishes several goals. First, the nature of the
relationship changes from state government-native in nature to
federal government-native-the relationship from which the trust
obligation springs. 43 Second, reduced state involvement promotes
An electoral scheme such as the OHA's, however, does not necessarily guarantee
total political autonomy. The agency's independence is limited because the legislature
controls its funding. NAThVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 89-90.
Current state law allocates only twenty percent of the income from public lands to the
OHA, with the rest going into the general state treasury. HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-13.5
(1993). This arrangement has withstood court challenges from those who believe that the
terms of the trust require all funds to be used to benefit natives. See, e.g., Hou Hawaiians
v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 945, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that as long as the trust proceeds
are used for one of the five specified purposes, the State of Hawaii has discretion in
allocating the funds). The significant amount of money at stake makes political tension
almost inevitable, as illustrated by the OHA's ongoing efforts to gain a greater share of
funds generated by income from the lease of public lands to businesses such as hotels,
shopping malls, and airports. See Trs. of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d
446, 458 (Haw. 1987) (designating the appropriate boundaries of a trust a political
question to be resolved by the legislature and not the judiciary); Podgers, supra note 94, at
78-79 (chronicling native challenges to state efforts to limit development or limit access to
public lands). The State and the OHA are currently in negotiations attempting to settle a
lawsuit over past-due revenues from ceded lands, with the amount owed estimated at
between $300 million and $1.2 billion. See Pat Omandan, Activism Takes Place on Many
Fronts, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, March 20, 2000, http:lstarbulletin.com2000/03120/
special/story6.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
141. Even if the entity or office in charge of appointments earnestly supports the
Native Hawaiian effort, sovereignty advocates are unlikely to endorse the arrangement
because it smacks of the "benevolent" paternalism that has characterized native relations
with outsiders. See Maunupau, supra note 85, at 48 (asserting that federal government
efforts to assist sovereignty are simply another means of control and domination over
natives); Mililani B. Trask, The Politics of Oppression, in HAWAI'I: RETURN TO
NATIONHOOD, supra note 13, at 71, 86-87 [hereinafter Trask, Politics of Oppression]
(presenting the pro-sovereignty view that federal programs instituted to assist natives act
as a continuing forced wardship).
142. Without pervasive government involvement, the Rice outcome might have been
different. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519 (2000) (noting that Congress cannot
authorize such a voting scheme, leaving open the possibility that tribes can). Even if the
OHA election had been conducted outside the state machinery, the Court could have held
that the method deprived some citizens of their right to vote on account of race. See Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (ruling that the state need not be formally involved
in an election for the Fifteenth Amendment to apply).
143. The State of Hawaii's administration of the OHA trust naturally de-emphasized
ties between the federal government and Native Hawaiians, which probably contributed to
their uncertain federal status. For instance, the OHA never attempted to pursue federal
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the deconstruction of a system in which entities other than Hawaiian
natives develop and manage a system of "self-governance."'
Thus,
recognition of Native Hawaiians, perhaps on the theory that the state's infrastructure was
sufficient. See Trask, Native Hawaiian Nationalism, supra note 13, at 24. States share
neither the same historical relationship with Native Americans nor the federal
government's express constitutional authority; thus their ability to deal directly with
Indians is more limited. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-22 (questioning Hawaii's ability to claim
the special relationship in its attempt to overcome the Fifteenth Amendment challenge
despite explicit authority delegating trust responsibilities to the State). But see
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,
500-01 (1979) (noting that "[s]tates do not enjoy [the] same unique relationship with
Indians," but upholding the state's authority to enact legislation in response to federal
law). The Court's pronouncements in Rice raise concerns for states that have granted
their own, independent recognition to tribes, some of which have not achieved federal
recognition. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-708 to 41-9-717 (2000) (Poarch Band of Creeks,
Mowa Band of Choctaws, Star Clan of Muscogee Creeks, Echota Cherokees, Cherokees
of northeast Alabama, the Cherokees of southeast Alabama, Ma-Chis Lower Creek
Indian Tribe); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-59a (1995) (Schaghticoke, Paucatuck Eastern
Pequot, Mashantucket Pequot, Mohegan, Golden Hill Paugussett); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29 § 105 (Michie 1997) (Nanticoke Indians); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-300 (Supp. 2000)
(Georgia Tribe of Eastern Cherokee, Lower Muscogee Creek Tribe, Cherokee of Georgia
Tribal Council); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:16A-53 (West Supp. 2000) (Confederation of the
Nanticoke Lenni Lenape Tribes, Ramapough Mountain Indians, Powhatan Renape
Nation); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143B-404 to 143B-411 (1999) (Coharie, Eastern Band of
Cherokees, Haliwa Saponi, Lumbees, Meherrin, Waccamaw-Siouan); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-138.1 (Michie 1998) (referring to "eight Virginia tribes officially recognized by the
Commonwealth"). States administering their own preference-based programs for native
groups have even more cause for alarm in the wake of Rice.
144. Native Hawaiian sovereignty groups are openly hostile towards the OHA,
perceiving the agency as a vehicle for state and federal control over their affairs, and
vehemently criticizing the current governing structure as a perpetuation of the wrongs
committed by the United States government. See MAST & MAST, supra note 83, at 371-72
(referring to the OHA and other government agencies as a colonialist effort to co-opt the
sovereignty movement (quoting Kekuni Blaisdell of the Pro-Kanaka Maoli Sovereignty
Working Group)); NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 92
(responding to concerns that a state agency should not be guiding sovereignty discussions);
Another Royal Scandal,THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1993, at 33, 33 (commenting on criticism
of the OHA's ties to the Democratic Party machinery); Trask, Politics of Oppression,
supra note 141, at 82 (asserting that the OHA's purpose "is to achieve assimilation of the
Native culture and to guarantee state control of Native trust lands in perpetuity"). One
commentator cites the OHA's reputation for scandal as one reason behind the distrust
towards those running the agency. See Trask, Native HawaiianNationalism,supra note 13,
at 23-24 (alleging that minutes of OHA meetings from 1982 through 1992 indicate that
some board members misused funds, falsified credentials, and misrepresented programs to
state leaders); Pennybacker, supra note 95 (noting that only two percent of the OHA's
$250 million total assets goes to help Native Hawaiians, who are badly in need of health
care, education, and jobs); see also Anwar, supra note 136 (referencing a statement by
Governor Cayetano describing the OHA board as "dysfunctional"); David Waite and
Tanya Bricking, Ex-OHA Trustees Headed Back to Office, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Nov. 8, 2000, http:llthe.honoluluadvertiser.com/2000INov/08/ll8ohamain.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (making note of perceptions that former trustees'
"bickering" was a barrier to progress). To push for sovereignty under a structure whose
origins are strongly rooted in the same government that bears responsibility for
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Native Hawaiians will be able to attain sovereignty on their own
terms. 145 Third, eliminating state intervention would allow Native
Hawaiians to seek explicit federal recognition that they share a
political relationship with the United States government that entitles
them to the benefits of the "unique obligation" Congress owes to the
Indians.
The bill proposed by the Hawaiian congressional delegation
would accomplish these objectives. 46 In addition to recognizing a
special relationship, the proposed legislation calls for re-establishing a
government-to-government relationship between the United States

and a reorganized Native Hawaiian sovereign group, removing the
State from its current administrative role. 47 This group would
construct its own definition of "Native Hawaiian"-enabling natives
suppressing the native population seems ill-conceived.
145. Hawaii has experienced an emergence of sovereignty groups who are working to
develop a mechanism for self-governance. See Shannon Brownlee, Taking Back the
Islands: Native Hawaiians' Claims for Sovereignty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept.
16, 1996, at 86,86 (observing the existence of "[d]ozens of sovereignty group ... each with
a different plan, ranging from outright secession from the United States to 'nation within a
nation' status similar to that of American Indians"); 'Aha Hawai'i 'Oiwi-Native Hawaiian
Convention, OperationalPlan,at http://www.hawaiianconvention.org/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (assembling delegates from various
Hawaiian organizations and sovereignty movements across the state to explore
sovereignty options); Hawai'i United for Liberation and Independence (HULI), at
http://www.HULI.orgl (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (asserting that Hawaii is a occupied state that never relinquished sovereignty);
Hui Kalai' aina, at http://members.nbci.com/HUIKALAIAINA/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (calling for self-governance and
establishment of a cultural refuge without eliminating current government institutions);
Kingdom of Hawai'i, Reinstatement & Recognition, at http://www.pixi.com/-kingdom/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (advocating the
reinstatement and restoration of the monarchy); see also Trask, Native Hawaiian
Nationalism, supra note 13, at 24-26 (documenting developments in the quest for selfdetermination). The most influential of these groups, Ka Lahui Hawai'i, founded by
lawyer Mililani B. Trask, has developed a series of strategies to move toward a "nationwith-a-nation" structure similar to that of Indians on the mainland. See Pennybacker,
supra note 95; Mililani B. Trask, Ka Lfhui Hawai'f" A Native Initiativefor Sovereignty, at
http://www.hawaii-nation.orglturningthetide-6-4.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (seeking inclusion in the special relationship and
return of native lands); Trask, Politicsof Oppression,supra note 141, at 84-86.
The emergence of 'Aha Hawai'i 'Oiwi (AHO), which encompasses sovereigntyseeking groups with divergent views, offers hope that Native Hawaiians will be able to
construct a quasi-sovereign entity without state or federal involvement that can lead to a
consensus regarding the form of self-governance. See Charles Rose, Viewpoint- Hawaiian
Convention is More Important Than Ever, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, March 11, 2000,
http://starbulletin.com2000/03/11/editorial/viewpoint.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
146. See S. 2899, 106thCong. (2000).
147. Id.
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for the first time to designate their own members-and would
develop its own governing body, working in conjunction with a
federal agency.' Such measures would provide a means for Native
Hawaiians to address comprehensively the sovereignty issues that
have plagued them since the American overthrow of their
government.
The Court's uncertain pronouncement on congressional
authority to declare Native Hawaiians eligible for special relationship
status leaves any legislation vulnerable to challenge. If the Court
determines that congressional power over Native American affairs is
less plenary than previously thought, Native Hawaiians risk losing not
only programs that benefit them, but any chance to attain the
sovereignty they seek. While Native Hawaiians await such a
determination, their best strategy is to work to secure their status
within the special relationship but prepare to defend preferential
programs under a strict scrutiny review. If and when the Supreme
Court decides to address the extent of Congress's power to handle
Indian affairs, answers to the weighty issues at which the Court
merely hinted in Rice will be revealed.
At first glance, the impact of Rice seems overwhelmingly
negative. The Court struck down a voting scheme intended to help
Native Hawaiians in their quest for self-governance, determined that
the ancestry-based definition used to define members of their group
was racial in nature, raised doubts about whether Congress has
authority to include Native Hawaiians in the federal-Indian special
relationship, and left preference programs that benefited them
vulnerable to challenge. Rice has, however, had some positive effects
on the Native Hawaiian goal of achieving self-determination. The
potential severity of harm to Native Hawaiians amplified attention to
their sovereignty efforts, sparked a series of initiatives designed to
secure their status under the federal trust relationship, boosted efforts
to promote self-governance, and put them on notice to defend their

148. Id. That the definition responsible for the invalidation of the Native Hawaiian
voting scheme originated in legislation passed without the natives' input is ironic and
evidences the strong case for allowing them to reclaim control over their affairs.
Additionally, cues from the Court regarding the ancestry requirement provide insight into
how the Native Hawaiian governing body can define its membership in a way that would
survive rational basis review. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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differential treatment. Without Rice, these important aspects of their
plight otherwise might have gone unnoticed.
KIMBERLY A. COSTELLO
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